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Employment Discrimination: State FEP Laws
and the Impact of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964
Discrimination [in employmentl is an economic waste and a
destuctive influence upon the greatest of our nation's resources
- its manpower. It is particularly damaging at a time when
America has great need for the skills and talents of all its
citizens .... *
0 F ALL the forms of discrimination made the target of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,1 discrimination in employment is the most
•T PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, EQUAL ECONOMIC
OPPoRTUNrrY 54 (1953).
1. 78 Star. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (1964). There are eleven tides in the 1964
Act. As the most comprehensive civil rights legislation ever enacted by Congress,
these eleven titles deal with problems of discrimination on account of race, color, re-
ligion, national origin, and in some instances sex in a broad variety of contexts. Title
I, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (1964), prohibits discriminatory denial of voting
rights. In general, this title may be regarded as articulating a number of discriminatory
devices currently in operation in many states and as establishing a reasonable presump-
tion for actions in federal courts against such practices. See Recent Statute, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 684, 685 (1965). Title II, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (1964), which is
the public accommodations section, forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin in any of four classes of establishments: (1) all establish-
ments offering lodging to transient guests, with the exception of rooming houses
with fewer than six rooms for rent and in which the owner resides; (2) dining facilities
and gasoline stations if they meet certain conditions; (3) places of exhibition or enter-
tainment if they customarily present sources of entertainment that move in interstate
commerce; and (4) captive facilities which meet certain conditions. A further discus-
sion of this title can be found in Note, Public Accommodations: A Justification of Title
11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 660 (1965); Recent Statute,
78 HARV. L REV. 684, 687 (1965). Title III, 78 Star. 246, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000b
(1964), deals with discrimination in the use of publicly owned or operated facilities,
and Title IV, 78 Stat. 246, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c (1964), prohibits discrimination in
public education. For an excellent discussion of the latter subject see generally Carter,
De Facto School Segregation: An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Ques-
tions Presented, 16 W. REs. L. REV. 502 (1965). Title VIII, 78 Star. 266, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000f (1964), directs the Secretary of Commerce to compile voting and
registration statistics in areas recommended by the Commission on Civil Rights, created
by the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1975, and Title V, 78 Stat. 249, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1975a (1964), extends the life of this Commission to 1968. Title VI, 78 Stat.
252, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (1964), forbids discrimination in programs or activities
receiving federal financial assistance, and Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e
(1964), which is the subject of this Note, prohibits discrimination by employers,
labor organizations, and employment agencies. In the remaining three titles, the
Attorney General is authorized to intervene in any action when relief from denial
of equal protection of the laws is sought (Title IX, 78 Star. 266, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000h-2
(1964)), a Community Relations Service is established to mediate disputes involving
civil rights (Title X, 78 Star. 267, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000g (1964)), and miscellaneous
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widespread and harmful to the nation.' All prospects of economic
advancement for the victims of employment discrimination and for
the nation as a whole are severely limited by the denial of the right
to be gainfully employed. All of the other rights protected by the
1964 Act flow from the right to equal employment opportunity3
Thus, from the point of view of the individual, the right to be served
in public places, the opportunity for education in integrated schools,
and the right to use publicly-owned facilities are meaningless to one
who has no money.4 From the point of view of society, employment
discrimination causes otherwise able persons to become public
charges, promotes waste of productive talent,' and in many instances
provisions are established for enforcement of the act (Title XI, 78 Star. 268, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000h (1964)).
2. In GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTENTIAL 9-10 (1956), it is stated that "the lessons
learned about the economic enfranchisement of the American Negro should prove useful
whenever men of intelligence and good will seek to remove the restrictions which hamper
disadvantaged groups. Only when the potential with which men and women are
born is allowed to develop fully can a society have both a sound foundation for economic
progress and individual contentment." A similar position is taken by THE PRESI-
DENT'S COMMITEE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, EQUAL EoONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
54 (1953).
3. As Senator Humphrey pointed out: "No civil rights legislation would be complete
unless it dealt with this problem." 110 CONG. REC 6327 (daily ed. March 30, 1964).
4. In considering H.R. 7152, the House Judiciary Committee commented on the sig-
nificance of Title VII as follows:
In other titles of this bill we have endeavored to protect the Negro's
right to first-class citizenship. Through voting, education, equal protection
of the laws, and free access to places of public accommodations, means have
been fashioned to eliminate racial discrimination.
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty
stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gain-
ful employment is ciosed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restau-
rant or hotel is a shallow victory where one's pockets are empty. The prin-
ciple of equal treatment under law can have little meaning if in practice its
benefits are denied the citizen. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. II, at 45 (1963).
5. The statistical profile of the problem is some indication of the economic loss
being suffered. According to the latest figures of the U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MAN-
POWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND A REPORT ON MANPOWER REQURMENiTS,
RESOURCES, UTILIZATION, AND TRAINING 43, 145 (1963), the unemployment rate
among adult Negro males has consistently averaged almost twice that of the white adult
male for the last four years. In some of the major industrial cities, over one-third of
the potential Negro work force is unemployed. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
STAFF REPORT, EMPLOYMENT 83-87 (1963). In addition, the median money income
of non-white workers is only about half of that of whites. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 331 (83d ed.
1962). Similar statistical disparities can be projected for almost any statistical criteria.
See generally Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity Before the General Sub-
committee on Labor of the House Education and Labor Committee and the Subcommittee
on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); HENDERSON, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF NEGROES: IN
THE NATION AND IN THE SOUTH passim (1963); HILL, THE NEGRO WAGE EARNER
AND APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING PROGRAMS pashim (1959); Barron, Negro Unem-
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diverts energies in harmful directions.6 The total effect, therefore,
is an estrangement of a significant portion of the population from
the mainstream of a productive society.7
Prevention of discrimination in employment, however, presents
problems quite different from those encountered in other forms of
discrimination. The problem of regulation, for example, involves
government inquisition into an area of decision-making involving a
multiplicity of factors, many of which are purely subjective.8 To
an employer, personnel decisions cannot be regulated by a body un-
familiar with the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of a particular busi-
ness.' On the other hand, the victims of employment discrimination
contend that regulation of employment practices must be far more
intense and personal in nature than conventional regulatory tech-
niques; for it does a man no good to obtain a job as a result of fair
employment practices if other more subtle discriminatory practices
prevent his advancement in that business.
The problem of employment discrimination also brings into fo-
cus the issue of federalism and the appropriate relationship of fed-
eral, state, and local regulation."° First, there is the attitude that
ployment - A Case Study, 3 NEW UNIVERSITY THOUGHT 42 (1963); Hill, Labor Un-
ions and the Negro, 28 COMMENTARY 479-88 (1959); Hill, Racism Within Organized
Labor: A Report of Five Years of the AFL-CIO, 1955-1960, 30 J. OF NEGRO EDUC.
109 (1961); Kessler, Economic Status of Nonwhite Workers, 1955-62, 86 MONTHLY
LABOR REV. 780 (1963).
6. MICHAEL, CYBERNATION: THE SILENT CONQUEST, A REPORT TO THE CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS passim (1962); Wright, Public
School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 16 W. RES. L. REV.
478 (1965).
7. It is impossible to estimate what is being lost to the economic system due to em-
ployment discrimination. One reliable source estimates the dollar cost is of the order
of $17 to $20 billion in gross national product every year. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS, COST OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION passim (Sept. 25, 1962). For other
studies of the cost of employment discrimination see GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS
AND AMERICAN LAW 170-186 (1959); MILLER, RICH MAN, POOR MAN 88-90
(1964); RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS AND POLITICS 175 (1953).
8. Cf. Comment, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs - Discriminatory Ef-
fects in Law Firm Hiring Practices, 73 YALE L. J. 625 (1964).
9. Congressman George Meader commented on this problem during the House Judici-
ary Committee's consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He stated that Title
VII of the 1964 Act "will have far reaching consequences on both management and
labor; contains onerous provisions for record keeping, inspection, and reporting; and
constitutes an important but ill-divised limitation upon the area of discretion and
decision making of both American businesses and American workers .... H.R. REP.
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
10. In Ferguson, The Federal Interest in Employment Discrimination: Herein the
Constitutional Scope of Executive Power to Withhold Appropriated Funds, 14 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 1 (1965), the author states that "one of the more striking characteristics
of non-academic discussion of American federalism problems is the frequency with which
race provides both the context and the subject matter of analysis. One need only recall
[VoL. 16:608
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"there is an overriding federal responsibility for both declaration
and policy implementation in employment discrimination."" This
is due not only to the fact that the federal government is a major
force in the totality of employment relations in the United States, 2
but also to its constitutional concern with the flow of interstate
commerce. 3 But at the same time, it must be recognized that at least
half the states have fair employment practices laws that declare dis-
crimination in public and private employment on racial, religious,
or ethnic grounds to be illegal. 4 There are also numerous municipal
ordinances dealing with fair employment practices and procedures. 5
The problem for the drafters of the 1964 Act was clear: What rela-
tionship should be achieved between Title VII and existing state and
local facilities for the elimination of discrimination in employment?
Supporters of a strong federal act declared that "state FEPC laws
have failed. They have failed because their potential was in fact
never realized."' 6  Their call, therefore, was "for broad federal ac-
the historical dialogue regarding slavery and the nature of the federal union transpiring
from the Constitutional Convention to the Civil War - and its final doctrinal bene-
diction delivered in Texas v. White. Even now, public discussion of federalism tends
to be provoked by and centered upon considerations which relate predominately [sic] to
issues of civil rights." Id. at 1. See also Ferguson, Civil Rights Legislation 1964: A
Study of Constitutional Resources, 24 FED. B.J. 102 (1964); Greenawalt, Legal Aspects
of Civil Rights in the United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5 J. INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS 247 (1965).
11. Ferguson, The Federal Interest in Employment Discrimination: Herein the Con-
stitutional Scope of Executive Power to Withhold Appropriated Funds, 14 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1 (1965).
12. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT, EMPLOYMENT 19 (1961).
13. See Ferguson, Civil Rights Legislation 1964: A Study of Constitutional Resources,
24 FED. BJ. 102 (1964).
14. See notes 27-30 infra and accompanying text.
15. For a summary of cities in states without FEP laws that have enacted antidis-
crimination ordinances, see BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
OF 1964, at 363-64 (1964). Municipal activity in this area is subject to attack on two
grounds. First, it may be argued that the municipality has no power to regulate, control,
forbid, or punish by ordinance, activity, or conduct which is also regulated, controlled,
forbidden, or made punishable by a general law of the state. Second, a municipal
ordinance may be attacked on grounds that there is no specific state sanction for the
legislation. With respect to employment discrimination, at least one state has ex-
pressly provided for the continued effectiveness of local antidiscrimination ordinances,
E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962 (1964), which provides in pertinent part that
"nothing contained in this act shall be deemed to repeal or supersede any of the provisions
of any existing or hereafter adopted municipal ordinance, municipal charter or of any
law of this Commonwealth relating to discrimination because of race, color, religious
creed, ancestry, age or national origin ...."
16. Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 23 (1964). Several reasons
have been advanced for this failure. First, it is stated that "the status of Negro labor in
northern states covered by fair employment practice laws has not changed in any basic
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tions to eliminate the deeply entrenched patterns of employment
discrimination."'" At the other extreme was an effort to make the
title inapplicable in any state which had an antidiscrimination law.
But this, it was soon recognized, would simply invite evasion of the
federal statute by unsympathetic state authorities. For these reasons,
Title VII provoked the most controversy and is the most complicated
of all the titles of the act. It is also this title which will most affect
businessmen and practicing attorneys. This Note will analyze the
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its in-
terrelationship with state and municipal laws on the same subject.
sense for the past twenty years, and is now further deteriorating." Id. at 23. One ex-
pert states that in the past decade there has been a "widening of the gap between the
income of whites and Negroes and in some cases it was fairly substantial. In Michigan,
for example, the ratio of average Negro income to white income dropped from 87
per cent in 1949 to 76 per cent in 1959." MILLER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 88. Second,
it is reported "that state FEP enactments have proved unable to cope with the problem
of changing the Negro occupational pattern and that FEP commissions do not provide
a solution to structural unemployment problems." Hill, supra at 23-24. Third, it is
submitted that many industries with important job opportunities for Negroes and
other minority groups are beyond the reach of state acts, and that immunity from state
and local laws exists as well in many important labor unions where exclusion of
minority groups is a tradition. Hill, Racism Within Organized Labor: A Report of Five
Years of the AFL-CIO, 1955-1960, 30 J. OF NEGRO EDuc. 109-18 (1961). Fourth,
several authorities have observed that most state commissions have had to operate under
the unfortunate circumstances of insufficient funds, inadequate staffs, and timid ad-
ministrators with neither the competence nor the sensitivity to cope with the realities
of the discrimination problem. See, e.g., Feild, Hindsight and Foresight About FEPC,
14 BUFFALO L. RW¢. 16, 18 (1964). But see AMERICAN JEWISH COMM'N, FAIR EM-
PLOYMENT PRAcriCES AT WORK IN TWELVE STATES (1958), which is considered
by some authorities as probably the most authoritative evaluation of the effectiveness
of state fair employment practices laws to be found. From the responses of the staffs
of twelve state commissions, the report concludes:
It is difficult in this factual summary to convey the sense of progress which
emerges from a close reading of the questionnaire responses and accompanying
documents submitted by the 12 states. They cite case after case in which
major discriminatory barriers were broken by the activities of the commission.
Many note that the very passage of the law has signified more than simply
an expression of a democratic climate of opinion; the existence of this anti-
discrimination legislation, coupled with a respect for law and the educational
and regulatory work of the commissions, has effected deep-rooted changes
in public opinion. These are not abstract changes; they can be measured in
new opportunities now available to minorities.
Less measurable, but perhaps of even greater significance in the long run,
is the impact of the laws upon the attitudes of minority groups themselves.
By protecting the civil rights of all citizens, these laws have helped create
among members of minority groups a new sense of confidence and optimism.
This is an immediate gain, for which the commissions are in part responsible.
And there is promise of even greater achievement in the years ahead. Id. at 39.
(Emphasis added.)
17. Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis With Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L REV. 22, 23 (1964).
[VoL 16:608
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I. STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
A. Origin and Development
-Modern state fair employment- practices laws and procedures
have their origin in President Roosevelt's Executive Order 8802
in 1941."8 The substance of that order was to establish the First
Fair Employment Practices Committee "to promote the full Lnd
equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without
discrimination because of race, creed, color or- national origin."' "
This committee was later reconstituted as an independent agency in
the Executive Office of the President. 0 However, Congress refused
to make this committee a permanent agency of the Government.2 '
Thus, to take up the void left by this refusal, President Truman
created the Committee on Goverhment Contract Compliance to po-
lice nondiscrimination clauses in government contracts.22 This 'was
the extent of the fair'employmenrt effort in the United States prior
to the enactment of the first state employment practices statute in
New York in 1945.23
18. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed.-Reg. 3109 -(i941): For a discussion of the'signifi-
cance of this order in a historical context see Wish, A Historian Looks'at Schol Segrega-
tion, 16 W. RES. L. REv. 555 (1965). Professor Wish stdtes that "although'it' [the
Fair Employment Practices Committee established by Executive Orde N6. 8802] was
temporary, it furnished a blue print for an entire progeny of state and local FEP laws."
Id. at 570.
19. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3.109 .(1941).
20. Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (1943).
21. See Maslow, FEPC - A Case-History in Parliamentary Maneuver, 13 U. Cm. 1.
REV. 407 (1946); Wilson, The-Proposed Legislative Death Knell of Private Discrimina-
tory Employment Practices, 31 VA, L REV. 798 (1945).
22. Exec. Order No. 10308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1951)." The Federal Faii' Employ-
ment Practices Conqmittee underwent several more changes during the Eisehhow~r and
Kennedy administrations. In 1953, Exec. Order No. 10479, 18"Fed. Reg. 4899' (1953),
was issued declaring that nondiscrimination in employment on government contracts was
"government policy"; at the saiie time, the Committee on Government Contracts was
created with the Vice-President as its chairman. This-committee was required to
send any complaints concerning discrimination in employment, upgrading, transfer,' or
recruitment to the federal agency holding the contract with direction" to that agency to
investigate the complaint and take appropriate action to eliminate the discrimination
charged. Machinery was also established during the Eisenhower administration to police
discrimination in the federal establishment itself. Exec. Order No. 10590, 20 Fed. Reg.
409 (1955) set up the Committee on Government Employment Policy replacing Presi-
dent Truman's Fair Employment Board which was created in 1948 as -part of the Civil
Service Commission. The former committee was authorized to supervise the nondis-
crimination program in the departments and agencies of the government and to make
such inquiries and investigations as necessary to carry out the nondiscrimination policy.
For a discussion of the changes made during the Kennedy administration see p. 631
infra.
23. Several states had statutes prohibiting discrimination in various fields of em-
ployment before 1945; however, none of these laws were comprehensive enough to be
considered fair employment practices acts. .FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES COMM'N,
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The New York Law Against Discrimination24 became the model
for other state enactments. In 1945, New Jersey passed a fair em-
ployment practices law which established a Division Against Dis-
crimination in the Department of Education,2 5 and Massachusetts
outlawed discrimination in employment a year later. 6 By 1949,
Connecticut, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington
had established fair employment practices commissions. Today,
more than half of the states outside the deep South have enacted leg-
islation in this field.
B. Operation of State FEP Laws
(1) Coverage of the Laws.-The statutes of the more than
twenty-five states that presently have some form of prohibition
against discrimination in employment may be broadly classified into
four groups: (1) statutes that provide for an administrative hearing
and judicial enforcement of orders of an administrative agency or of-
ficial;2" (2) statutes that do not provide for any type of administrative
FIRST REPORT 148-49 (1945). Most of these laws were directed against discrimina-
tion in such areas of employment as state civil service, public works contractors, law
practice, public education, and utility companies. For further discussion of these early
statutes see KONvrrz & LBSKs, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 197-98 (1961).
24. N.Y. Laws of 1945, ch. 118, § 134. This section states that the act shall be deemed
an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare,
health, and peace of the people of the state; it is in fulfillment of § 11 of the 1938
New York Constitution concerning civil rights. N.Y. CONsT. art. 1, 5 11. This sec-
tion provides as follows: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws
of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed
or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person
or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision
of the state." This novel provision in the Bill of Rights of the New York Constitution
was the first of its kind. As stated by the 1938 constitutional convention bill of rights
chairman during his introduction of 5 11 to the convention: "[Tihe state alone can
make laws dealing with discriminatory practices of those within its jurisdiction....
An examination of the constitutions of our sister states discloses that not a single one
of them contains any provision seeking to prohibit discrimination on the part of indi-
viduals, firms or corporations upon racial, religious or any other ground." N.Y. CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 2 REV. RECORD 1068 (1938). However, a similar pro-
vision is now contained in the New Jersey Constitution. N.J. CONST. art. I, 5 5.
25. N.J. Laws 1945, ch. 169.
26. Mass. Laws 1946, ch. 368.
27. ALASKA STAT. 55 23.10.215, .220 (1962); CAL LABOR CODE 55 1424, 26;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 55 80-21-7, -8 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 31-127,
128 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 5 711 (Supp. 1964); Hawaii Sess. Laws 1963,
§5 2-5; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 858(b),(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); IND.
ANN. STAT. 55 40-2312(k)(l) (Supp. 1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005
(1961); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, 55 5, 6 (Supp. 1964); MiCH. STAT. ANN.
55 17.458(7),(8) (Supp. 1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. 55 363.07, .08 (Supp. 1963);
Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 296-040 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. §5 18:25-13, -17 (1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. 55 59-4-10, -11 (1960); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 297, 298; OHIO
REV. CODE § 4112.05; ORE. REV. STAT. 55 659.060, .070 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN.
[VoL 16:608
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agency or judicial enforcement of orders, but do make employment
discrimination a misdemeanor; 28 (3) statutes that are strictly volun-
tary and have no enforcement provision;29 and (4) statutes that are
applicable only to labor unions and suppliers of military goods to
the state or federal government.3"
The present state fair employment practices statutes cover 41
per cent of the Negro population in the United States.3 ' In general,
they are aimed at employers, unions, and employment agencies. They
make it unlawful to refuse to hire, employ, bar, discharge, or pro-
mote individuals because of race, creed, color, or national origin.
The minimum number of employees needed for coverage ranges
from four3" to one hundred or more.3" Alaska3 4 and Wisconsin,"5
however, do not limit coverage to employers with more than a cer-
tain number of employees. Most state laws cover political subdivi-
sions, but exempt social clubs and fraternal, charitable, educational,
or religious associations not organized for profit.38
(2) Types of Discrimination Covered.-The majority of state
FEP laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
and national origin, and several state commissions have been given
authority to police job discrimination on account of age. Only
tit. 43, §§ 959, 960 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-18, -28 (1957); Utah
Sess. Laws 1965, § 7; WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.250, .260 (1962); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.36(3) (1957). See also Ariz. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 9, § 41-1481; Nev.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 332, § 10; Wyo. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 170, § 6, 7, which do not
become effective until July 1, 1965.
28. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7301(1) (Supp. 1963); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 735.6
(Supp. 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1) (Supp. 1963). See also P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 29, 55 146, 147 (Supp. 1963).
29. Okla. Sess. Laws 1963, §§ 1-7; W. VA. CODE ANN. 5 2317 (1961).
30. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-214, 215 (1960), declares it to be the policy of the
state (1) that no representative agency of labor shall discriminate against any person
in collective bargaining because of his race or color, and (2) makes it unlawful for any
person, firm, or corporation engaged in producing military supplies or equipment to
refuse to employ a citizen because of his race, color, creed, religion, or national origin.
31. Hill, sapra note 17, at 32.
32. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.01.
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 852 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964). Only those states
whose laws cover employers of 50 or more have more limited coverage than the federal
law, which, when fully effective, will cover employers of 25 or more employees. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 5 701(b), 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e.
34. ALASKA STAT. 5 23.10.190 (1962).
35. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (1957).
36. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.01 (A), (B); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(3)
(1957). A similar approach is taken by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(b), 78
Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1964). For a further discussion of this and other
exemptions under the 1964 Act see text at pp. 637, 38 infra.
37. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.10.240 (1962); CAL. UNEMP. INS. § 2070; COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 81-4-16 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (1960); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (Supp. 1964); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:893 (1964); MD. ANN.
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a few state acts have been amended to add a prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on sex. 8 Apart from fair practice acts, but neverthe-
less necessary to any consideration of fair employment practices, are
the laws in many states requiring the observance of equal pay for
equal work by male and female employees.39
(3) Administration and Enforcement.-There are numerous
differences among the state FEP laws with respect to administration
and enforcement procedures. However, it is possible to recognize
among the various fully enforceable FEP laws the following provi-
sions in common: (1) complaints may be filed by the aggrieved in-
dividual; (2) an investigation is then ordered to determine whether
there is merit to the charge; (3) if no probable cause is found to
support the complaint, it is dismissed;4" (4) if the commission does
find sufficient evidence of discriminatory practice to support the
complaint, an attempt is made to adjust the matter through media-
tion and conciliation; (5) if unsuccessful in such effort, the com-
mission is then authorized to proceed by public hearing to make find-
ings of fact and law; (6) such a hearing results in either a dismissal
of the complaint, or the issuance of a cease and desist order requir-
ing the respondent to end the discriminatory practice charged and to
take any additional affirmative remedial action required; (7) these
orders are enforceable by court decree, the violation of which con-
stitutes contempt of court; and (8) judicial review is available to a
person claiming to be aggrieved by a commission ruling. On the
face of it, the procedures for administration and enforcement out-
CODE art. 100, § 78 (Supp. 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (Supp.
1964); N.J. STAT. ANsN. § 18:25-12 (1964); N.Y. EXEcUTIVE LAw § 296; OHIO
REV. CODE § 4101.17; ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.024 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,§ 955 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-6-1 to -16 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.180, .200 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5) (b) (Supp. 1965).
38. Hawaii Sess. IAws 1963, § 1 (a); N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296; Utah Sess. Laws
1965, § 6; Wis. STAT. ANN. 111.32(5)(a) (Supp. 1965). Vermont forbids dis-
crimination on account of sex as to rates of pay. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 21, § 495 (5)
(Supp. 1963). See also Ariz. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 9, § 41-1481; Wyo Sess. Laws
1965, ch. 170, § 1, which do not become effective until July 1, 1965.
39. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE 5 4111.17.
40. Even though a commission finds no probable cause to support the particular com-
plaint filed, it is authorized in some states to continue investigation into the employer's
general employment pattern and attempt to eliminate any discriminatory practice found.
See, e.g., OHIO R.Ev. CODE § 4112.05(G) which provides in pertinent part that "if
upon all the evidence the commission determines that the respondent has engaged in,
or is engaging in, any unlawful discriminatory practice, whether against the complain-
ant or others, the commission shall . . . cause to be served on such respondent an order
requiring such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful discriminatory prac-
tice. ... (Emphasis added.) By implication, the New York Court of Appeals has
also upheld the commission's authority in that state to eliminate all unlawful discrimi
natory practices, not just the one cited in the complaint. See Holland v. Edwards, 307
N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
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lined above seem to indicate that state FEP laws provide effective
and efficient methods for eliminating job discrimination. However,
many authorities believe, and studies of state FEP procedures reveal,
that "from their very inception ... [state commissions] were inef-
fectual agents of social change."' It is therefore worthwhile to ex-
plore these procedures a bit further to determine where the alleged
failure has occurred and what effect this failure will have on enforce-
ment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
(a) Complaints.-One of the greatest shortcomings of state
FEP laws is said to be the disappointingly low number of complaints
received by the commissions.42 The responsibility for this has been
placed with the commissions," as well as with. the civil rights organi-
41. Hill, supra note 17, at 33. In BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE 128-29 (1952),
the author reports from his study of the New York State Commission Against Discrim-
ination that that commission's disposition of complaints was not likely to encourage
other workers to file complaints. "[W]hen two out of three complainants find their
charges not sustained... it is probable -that few workers come away from an experience
with SCAD in a mood to recommend the same procedure to their friends among the
minority groups." Id. at 135. For further criticisms of the New York procedures and
FEP laws in other states see Berger, The New York State Law Against Discrimination:
Operation and Administration, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 747 (1950); McKenney, Fair Em-
ployment in Massachusetts, 13 PHYLON 141 (1952); ComMME To SUPPORT THE
IvEs-QuINN LAW, REcQMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE NEW
YORK STATE COMMISSION AGAINST DIsCIUMINAToN (1948); Note, The Operation
of State-Fair Employment Practices Commissions, 68 HARv. L. REv. 685 (1955). See
generally KESSELMAN, THE SOCIAL PoLIcS OF FEPC 25-46 (1948); Ross, ALL
MANNER OF MEN passim (1948); Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimi-
nation Legislation - Experience Under the New York Law Against Discrimination,
40 CORNELL L.Q. 40. (1954); Hunt, The Proposed Fair Employment Practice Act;
Facts and Fallacies, 32 VA. L. REV. 1 (1945); Maslow, FEPC - A Case History in
Parliaentary Maneuver, 13 U. Cm. L. REV. 407 (1946); Maslow & Robinson, Civil
Righti'Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. Cm. L REV. 363(1953); Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 CALIF. L. REV.
388 (1945); Robison, Survey of 1959 Ohio Legislation, The New Fair Employment
Law, 20 OHIO ST. LJ. 570 (1959); Note, An American Legal Dilemma - Proof of
Discrimination, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 107 (1949); Note, The Fair Employment Practices
Act-- Oregon, 32 ORE. L. REv. 177 (1953).
42. A 1963 survey by the House Labor Committee of the FEP laws of 12 states from
the date of the laws' enactment through December 31, 1961, showed that just over
19,000.complaints were submitted. 110 CONG. REc. 6987 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
At first glance, this total may seem to indicate a respectable effort. However, as is
pointed out in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CMIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964,
at 61 (1964), this figure "includes some 7,500 complaints filed in New York over a
16-year period, which averages out to about 470 cases a year in the state which probably
has the most active commission of all. In other states, the case load runs from an
average of 25 a year in Oregon and Rhode Island to 200 to 300 a year in Pennsylvania
and Massachusetts."
43. RUCHAMES, op. cit. supra note 7, commenting on the progress of the New
York Commission, states that the commission's policies have contributed to the impres-
sion that it has accomplished very little and that its scrutiny is easily evaded. Part of
the reason for this the writer attributes to the small number of complaints filed each
year, "far smaller than prevailing discriminatory practice would seem to call forth. As
a result of the current small number of complaints being received ... and the fact that
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zations. "For the most part, however, this dearth seems inherent
in the plight of minority groups, the law's inevitable delays and bur-
dens, and the inability of the commissions fully to protect complain-
ants."44 Thus, it has been suggested that what is really needed is a
systematic, comprehensive pattern of complaint filings, with a
thoughtful, well-integrated, prearranged program for commission
action on such complaints.4" This would at least encourage less dis-
sipation of commission resources on "unrelated, relatively insignifi-
cant, [and] less traceable aspects of discrimination." 4
One method of implementing this more comprehensive program
would be to allow private groups to file complaints on behalf of
individuals.47 This would tend to uncover many discriminatory prac-
they do not reflect existing discriminatory practices, the commission's efforts must ulti-
mately prove inadequate." Id. at 175. On this same point, the executive officer of
the California Fair Employment Practice Commission revealed that the compliance pro-
gram of the California Commission, which stems from receipt of miscellaneous indi-
vidual complaints, is a piecemeal, wholly inadequate method of operation. Hearings
on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211 and S. 1937 Before the Subcommittee on Employment and
Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
227 (1964). (Emphasis added.) He concluded that there is no correlation between
the existence of discrimination patterns in employment and the number of complaints
filed.
44. Girard & Jaffe, Some General Observations on Administration of State Fair Em-
ployment Practice Laws, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 114, 115 (1964).
45. Herbert Hill, National Labor Secretary of the NAACP, states that "the record
proves that the individual complaint approach is totally inadequate and is incapable of
dealing with the fact that 'the great mass of Negro workers remains in the lowest levels
of employment,' that few are employed in public agencies and that most Negroes occupy
'unskilled or menial positions, with little jobs open and available to the general labor
force.'" Hill, supra note 17, at 40.
46. Girard & Jaffe, supra note 44, at 115. As one leader of a civil rights organiza-
tion put it: "Negroes ... do not care whether FEPC administrators detect some vague
atmosphere of acceptance when FEPC has not resulted in new, tangible jobs. The white
liberal may have his conscience eased by talk of an atmosphere of equality, but the
unemployed Negro prefers reality to psychological wish-fulfillment." Hill, supra note
17, at 41. A California case is illustrative of this type of token integration. There,
a Negro's application for a job as a gas station attendant with a large oil company
was allegedly rejected because of race. The California Commission learned that al-
though the company's standing policy was to accept applications from all potential
employees, not one out of its 180 attendants in stations in the area was Negro. The
commission persuaded the company to re-evaluate the complainant's application and
ultimately he got the job. CAL. FEPC ANN. REP. 9-10, 19-27, 31-34 (1959-60).
The commission regarded this agreement as a successful adjustment, even though the
commission records indicated that this company had no other Negro employees. Rec-
ords produced by the Minnesota State Commission Against Discrimination during
Senate Hearings on civil rights legislation reveal that adjustments of individual
complaints involving no more than acquiescence in hiring the single Negro complain-
ant is often taken as proof by the commission that the respondent-employer has elimi-
nated its racist practices. Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211 and S. 1937, supra
note 43, at 244-52 (prepared statement of James C. McDonald).
47. See Comment, The New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination: A New
Technique For An Old Problem, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 855 (1947). A few states
already have provisions extending this privilege to private associations organized for
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tices which at the present time go undetected because of minority
group ignorance of antidiscrimination laws or belief that enforce-
ment bodies are ineffectual and perhaps indifferent to the protection
of their interests.48 However, as mentioned previously, most states
do not allow this privilege;4" usually the complaint must be filed by
the aggrieved individual or his attorney."0 Supplementing a more
comprehensive complaint program with a provision giving the com-
mission authority to initiate an investigation on its own without the
submission of a complaint by an aggrieved individual would also
contribute to a more efficacious system.5 At the present time, how-
the purpose of curbing discrimination. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 28-5-17 (1956).
The New York Commission has been able to reach the same result by construing "ag-
grieved person" to include such private groups. NEW YORK STATE COMM'N AGAINST
DISCRIMJNATION, 1948 REPORT OF PROGRESS 51 [hereinafter cited as N.Y. ANN.
REP.]. It has been revealed, however, that even in states where private groups are
permitted to initiate complaints, little use has been made of the privilege. Comment,
supra at 855 n.144 (1947); Note, 68 HARV. L REV. 685, 692 n.44 (1955).
48. Research has revealed no comprehensive study made on public awareness of
antidiscrimination statutes. For a partial study made in New York see Berger, supra
note 41, at 768. However, one authority is quite clear in stating that those who are
aware of the protections afforded them by state FEP laws have generally become disil-
lusioned as to their efficacy. Herbert Hill states that the California Commission, for
example, "has chosen to answer conservative critics by claiming that FEPC action will
not really alter the status quo. This tactic succeeds in placating the business interests
that originally opposed FEPC, but it also reveals the actual character of FEPC to the
Negro worker and his community. Thus there should be no cause to wonder at in-
creasing Negro disillusionment with anti-discrimination commissions and the frequent
recourse to direct mass action." Hill, supra note 17, at 46.
49. The rationale in states following this view is that only the aggrieved person has
standing to raise the complaint; that civil rights organizations and other private groups
are not aggrieved persons and that the public interest is adequately protected by allow-
ing a state official, such as the attorney general, to file a complaint. See McKenney,
supra note 41, at 146-47; OPs. N.J. AT'fY GEN. No. 2 (1946). New Mexico, for
example, allows its attorney general to file a complaint. N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 59410
(1953).
50. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. 5 659.040 (1961).
51. See AMRICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, COMMfN ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION,
MODEL FEP BILL § 9(b). At the present time, four states have provisions giving the
commission authority to initiate complaints: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-125 (1960);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, 5 5 (Supp. 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-18
(1956); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.230 (1962). It is said that the New York Com-
mission also has the power to investigate the problems of discrimination even in the ab-
sence of a verified complaint by way of N.Y. ExEcuTnvE LAW § 290, which provides
that "a state agency is hereby created with power to eliminate and prevent discrimina-
tion in employment ... and the commission established hereunder is hereby given gen-
eral jurisdiction and power for such purposes." See also Board of Higher Educ. v.
Carter, 14 N.Y.2d 138, 199 N.E.2d 141, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964); Spitz, Tailoring
The Techniques To Eliminate And Prevent Employment Discrimination, 14 BUFFALO
L REV. 79, 80 (1964). However, it has been revealed that even in states where the
commission is given authority to initiate complaints on its own, some have consistently
refrained from using these powers. See, e.g., the testimony of Mr. Walter H. Wheeler,
Jr., before the Senate Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity, Hearings on S. 773,
S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937, supra note 43, at 208-11. The reason for this timidity
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ever, this authority is usually employed only for educational and
exhortatory purposes."
(b) Establishing Probable Cause.--Of even greater concern to
civil rights organizations than the low number of complaints filed
under present state systems is the uncertainty of the requirement
of probable cause and the delay caused by its determination."
After a verified complaint has been filed charging a violation of
the law, the general procedure is for the commission to undertake a
preliminary investigation to determine whether the allegations are
supported by probable cause.5" A large portion of the complaints
are dismissed at this point for failure to find such support for their
allegations.55 This requirement that the commission find probable
seems to lie in the commission's belief "that sweeping investigations on their own
initiative would alienate industry and, eventually, the public, and they maintain that
attempts to eliminate discriminatory practices will be successful only if industry is not
antagonistic toward the law." Note, 68 HARV. L. REv. 685, 693 (1955).
52. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 42, at 61.
53. To the end of 1947, the average time required to dispose of a case in New York
was three months. "This is obviously too long a period to be effective for a worker
who has experienced discrimination, since it is not likely that he can afford to remain
unemployed for more than a few weeks while his complaint is being handled." BERGER,
op. cit. supra note 41, at 135. More recently, important cases have been filed in New
York which have taken from 1 to 2- years to resolve. See, e.g., Mitchell v. R&S Plumb-
ers & Mechanical Systems, Inc., C-9092-62 (N.Y. State Comm'n for Human Rights
1964), wherein 17 months after the complaint was filed, the commission issued its
determination; Holmes v. Falikman, C-7580-61 (N.Y. State Comm'n for Human Rights
1963), wherein the complaint filed against Local 10 of the International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union was finally disposed of after 25 months when the ILGWU en-
tered into a stipulation upon which the complaint was finally withdrawn. For a further
discussion of investigatory procedure and problems of delay in investigation see.Rabkin,
Enforcement of Laws Against Discrimitpation in Employment, 14 BUFFALO L. REV.
100 (1964); Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 526, 533 (1961).
54. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.05 (B).
55. The exact proportion dismissed at this stage is difficult to determine. A com-
mission may dismiss a specific individual complaint for lack of probable cause, but find
other discriminatory practices which are not distinguished from the particular com-
plaint filed. New York is one of the few states to make this distinction it its com-
plaints. There, it is reported that 70% of the verified complaints filed are dismissed.
N.Y. STATE COMM'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 4-5 (mimeo ed. 1962)_ In
one-third of these dismissals, however, the commission has found discriminatory prac-
tices other than those alleged in the complaint. In California, 67% were dismissed
because of insufficient evidence. CAL. FEPC ANN. REP. 10 (1959-60). Massachu-
setts has a particularly dismal record in light of the fact that it has one of the oldest
commissions in years of operation and gives its commission extensive powers under
the statute. Between 1946 and 1961, that commission was unable to find probable
cause in about 50% of the claims filed. MASS. COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
ANN. REP. 35 (1961). New Jersey reports a similar record of 59% of the com-
plaints dismissed for lack of probable cause. N.J. DEP'T OF EDuc., Div. AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION ANN. REP. 12-13 (1957-58). The comparatively young Minnesota
Commission also reports a dismissal of about 50% of its employment discrimination
cases for lack of sufficient cause. For a further discussion of the disposition of such
cases in 13 states, see 110 CONG. REc. 6987 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
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cause of unlawful discrimination as a condition precedent to an exer-
cise of its enforcement powers has caused considerable controversy
among civil rights organizations. " More specifically, the claim is
made that no definite standards have been established as to what con-
stitutes probable cause; "7 that the commissions have applied many dif-
ferent standards to ascertain the existence of probable cause and such
uncertainty materially handicaps the activities of these groups in ap-
praising commission determinations."a On the other hand, there
are authorities who believe that "indefiniteness has a positive aspect
to the extent that it gives commissions more flexibility and control
over their activities."59  Furthermore, since absolute proof of dis-
crimination is next to impossible,"0 it would seem that commissions
ought to be permitted to function within a very broad standard of
probable cause. As one court has stated: "One intent on violating
the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected to declare or
announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his
discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle
and elusive - for we deal with an area in which 'subtleties of con-
duct.., play no small part' .... All of which amply justifies the
legislature's grant of broad power to the commission to appraise,
correlate, and evaluate the facts uncovered."'" Thus, it would seem
that what the critics of a flexible concept of probable cause really
want is not a greater definiteness or elaboration of standards, but
rather a relaxation of the requirement as it has been applied by com-
missions. And this appears to be a legitimate demand, for if one
considers the fact that about one-half of the complaints filed are dis-
missed for lack of probable cause, there is a strong indication that
commissions have been too rigorous in their requirement of a show-
ing of discrimination.'a
Finally, it has been suggested that more state FEP laws should
provide for judicial review of the commission's dismissal of a com-
56. See Girard & Jaffe, supra note 44, at 118.
57. Ibid.
58. Most commissions seem to require more than a showing of a prima facie case to
establish probable cause. See Note, 68 HARv. L. REV. 685, 693 n.50 (1955). Others
hold, however, that a presumption of discrimination may arise from refusal of an em-
ployer who has no employees of the minority group to hire a qualified applicant of
that group. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 42, at 61.
59. Girard & Jaffe, supra note 44, at 118.
60. The exception, of course, is the clear-cut case where an employer runs a "whites
only" advertisement for employment, or where an employer inquires into the race or re-
ligion of a job applicant.
61. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 45, 119 N.B.2d 581, 584 (1954).
62. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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plaint.63 In most states, the only form of review available may be
by way of extraordinary relief, such as mandamus for arbitrary or
capricious commission action.64 A few commissions, however, have
established an intra-agency appeal from the dismissal of a com-
plaint.65
(c) Conciliation and Mediation.-If the investigating commis-
sioner finds probable cause, he attempts to eliminate the discrimina-
tory practice by conciliation or persuasion. In the fifty per cent or
less of the complaints wherein probable cause has been found, over
ninety-five per cent have been disposed of by conciliation without the
need of a public hearing.66 It is stated that the reason for this high
percentage of voluntary compliance lies in the commission's antici-
pated danger in utilizing the threat of punitive measures.67 They
are reluctant to enter into public hearings or to issue cease and desist
orders because they fear that such action will increase employer and
labor union resistance to any conciliatory efforts.68 In the opinion
of one authority, this timid approach is "symptomatic of a weak-
63. See generally Hill, supra note 17, at 22.
64. See Comment, supra note 47, at 859 nn. 179 & 180.
65. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4 (1953).
66. The 1963 study of the Senate Labor Committee yields significant figures on the
experiences of state commissions in the enforcemcnt of state fair employment practices
laws. Senator Clark of this committee reports that of the more than 19,000 complaints
filed in 13 states from the inception of the laws in those states until December 1961,
only 62 resulted in public hearings. In addition, it is significant to note that of these
62 cases that went to the hearing stage, only 26 resulted in cease and desist orders and
only 18 in court actions. 110 CONG. REC. 6987 (daily ed. April 8, 1964). In Ohio,
complaints have been filed since 1959, the date of the law's enactment. Two cases
have resulted in public hearings, only 1 in a cease and desist order, and no case has
resulted in court action. Ibid.
67. With respect to the New York experience, Herbert Hill states that "the Com-
mission resisted the demands of those who sought pressure to enforce compliance and
frequently claimed that the alternative to its timid approach was to administer the law
in an atmosphere of hostility and conflict. It presented an either/or alternative of
conciliation or conflict, disregarding that a possible middle path between conciliation
and harshness could be achieved." Hill, supra note 17, at 36. But the New York
Commission has given other reasons for seeking as much voluntary compliance as pos-
sible. It takes the position that compulsive action resulting in temporary compliance
is of little or no avail without a policing operation "that in the end would assume
formidable proportions." BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 42,
at 62.
68. In Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A Critical
Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 38 (1964), it is stated: "It
is evident that state commissions are much too concerned with avoiding hostility from
businessmen, too careful to refrain from interfering with the stability of manufacturing
enterprise or union power, and insufficiently concerned with the welfare of the Negro
job seeker."
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ness in the commission's policy."69  Such weakness has caused many
commissions to settle for less than full compliance with the law.7"
Conciliation agreements do, however, accomplish the proper re-
sults in many instances. Since the investigating commissioner is
usually given broad discretion in determining the method of allevi-
ating a particular discriminatory practice,"1 a great variety of terms
have been included in agreements." Furthermore, compliance may
69. RucHAMEs, RAcE, JoBs AND POLITICS 173 (1953). But see Spitz, Patterns of
Conciliation Under the New York State Law Against Discrimination, 125 N.Y..J. 1246
(April 6, 1951), wherein it is stated:
The process of concilation is necessarily an adjustment of differences. It
demands the darity of head to know when to give way and when to stand
firm. It demands the courage to stand absolutely firm on points which matter
and to give way with good grace on points which do not. The essence of
the conciliation process is compromise. Compromise does not signify retreat
because one is too timid to press one's convictions, nor does it signify moral
inertia. Compromise is an essential requirement of the law, necessitated,
among other things, by the difficulty of proving discrimination even when one
has found probable cause to credit the allegations of a complaint. Id. at
1248-49.
70. Settlement of complaints by conciliation does not, in many cases, entail compul-
sory hiring of the complainant or payment of back pay from the employer found guilty
of discriminatory practices. Many commissions just do not feel impelled to demand such
relief, considering their main function to be the promotion of an "educational message'
rather than settlement of complaints by enforcement of the law. See, e.g., Hearings on S.
773, S. 1210, S. 1211, and S. 1937, supra note 43, at 228-29, where the Executive
Officer of the California Fair Employment Practice Commission testified that his com-
mission was more concerned with attainment of a proper educational environment than
with full use of commission powers to gain new jobs for minority group workers.
Similarly, the Vice-Chairman of Missouri's commission stated that although it had a
three pronged program of education, research, and enforcement, the primary task was
education. Id. at 236.
71. Many state laws do not expressly define the commission's power at the conciliation
level. However, most states have construed the general statutory directive - "to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices whenever possible by conciliation and persuasion" - as
permitting the commission to insist that the respondent take any action which the
commission could order after a hearing. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws. ANN. § 28-5-16
(1956). But within this broad range of discretion, the views of the commissioner
investigating the claim as to the purpose of his job may have a great deal of influence
on the terms of the settlement. "[I]f the commissioner views his job as being primarily
one of eliminating discrimination and only secondarily one involving exercise of quasi-
judicial powers, he will insist on conciliation agreements which advance the goal of the
law, the elimination of discrimination in employment. On the other hand, it is under-
standable that the investigating commissioner, when entering into the process of con-
ciliation, may well seek to achieve the speediest possible compromise by splitting the case
down the middle. This may result in the denial to the victim of discrimination of com-
plete redress of his grievances." Rabkin, supra note 53, at 108. It is therefore sug-
gested by some critics of this procedure that "every conciliation agreement, before being
finally accepted and approved by the commissioner, be submitted to an auto-
matic review by the entire commission. In other words, every enforcing agency should
set up a procedure for auditing proposed conciliation agreements to make sure that the
agreement does the maximum job for advancing the goal of the law, the elimination of
discrimination in employment." Id. at 108-09.
72. The broad range of terms that may be included in conciliation agreements is indi-
cated by the following examples. The investigating commissioner may require respon-
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be insured by a provision in the agreement for reinspection of the
case at specified periods.73 If the commission finds that the re-
spondent has breached the agreement, it may reopen the proceedings
and again attempt to secure compliance, or proceed directly to a pub-
lic hearing. 4 Where the continuation of discriminatory practices is
considered especially likely, some commissions have sought to em-
body consent orders in conciliation agreements.75 Under such agree-
ments, the respondent not only agrees to take affirmative action to
eliminate discriminatory practices, but also agrees to waive a hearing
and permit the commission to apply directly to a court for enforce-
dents to offer employment to qualified complainants as part of the terms of conciliation.
See, e.g., N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 297(2). It is generally agreed, however, that the
employer is always entitled to consider an applicant's qualification and competency. See
Spitz, supra note 51, at 84. But terms of conciliation frequently require that the
complainant's qualifications be assessed by the commission rather than the employer. See,
e.g., Byams v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R.R., N.Y. ANN. REP. 57 (1956). In many cases, the
employer is required to either offer complainant employment or give him back pay.
See, e.g., Lard v. Bond Sewing Stores, N.Y. ANN. REP. 65 (1951). The amount of
pay may represent the actual loss sustained by the aggrieved individual; Calvin v. Cal-
mar Steamship Corp., N.Y. ANN. REP. 44 (1953); the loss estimated by the commis-
sion; Sweet v. Towers Hotel Corp., N.Y. ANN. REP. 44 (1953); or a consequential
loss of subsequent employment as a result of the discriminatory practice charged. See
OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.05. But see Van Cleve Hotel Co., 18 OHIO Op. 2d 229
(1962). Promotion of a complainant has also been made a term of the agreement. See,
e.g., Care v. Delaware & Hudson R.R., N.Y. ANN. REP. 39 (1953). labor unions
have also been required to admit complainants to membership; Workman v. Bottlers &
Drivers Union, N.Y. ANN. REP. 94 (1955); or give seniority status commencing with
the date of entry into the industry. Miller v. Checkers & Clerks Union, N.Y. ANN. REP.
106 (1959). Terms of conciliation may also require unions to abandon restrictions
limiting membership to members of a particular national origin. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEcU-
TIVE LAW § 296(1) (b). A labor union may also be required to eliminate policies of
segregating Negroes in auxiliary locals; Rinard v. Walsh, N.Y. ANN. REp. 92 (1955);
or relegating them to segregated hiring halls. Carry v. Hall, N.Y. ANN. REP. 61
(1951). But see Musicians' Protective Union, 19 OHIO Op. 2d 26 (1962), wherein
the court upheld segregation between two local unions where there was no evidence
that the locals had followed a pattern of discrimination. In addition, employment
agencies have agreed to discontinue the use of proscribed forms of designating the ap-
plicant's race, religion, or national origin in advertisements, employment forms, and
statements to applicants. See, e.g., Smith v. Sims, N.Y. ANN. REP. 67 (1951).
73. One aspect of such reinspection involves periodic examination of sources and
techniques of employee recruitment. Many statutes expressly authorize the com-
mission to require a report of the manner of compliance. See, e.g., N.Y. EXECUTIVE
LAW § 297 (2); OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, RULES AND REGULATIONS art. 111(9)
(1963). Thus, a union may be required to furnish a list of its membership rules and
membership applicants; Miller v. Checkers & Clerks Union, N.Y. ANN. REP.
106 (1959); or notify the commission of action taken on transfer requests. Carry
v. Hall, N.Y. ANN. REP. 61 (1951). An employment agency has been required to
make books and records available to the commission from time to time. Westreich v.
Wall St. Employment Bureau, N.Y. ANN. REP. 53 (1952). Likewise, employers
have been required to record the color of job applicants; Ridley v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., N.Y. ANN. REP. 27 (1948); or periodically report the employment status
of Negroes in a particular job. Patterson v. Grace Line, N.Y. ANN. REP. 110 (1960).
74. See Rabkin, supra note 53, at 109; Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 685, 694 (1955).
75. See N.Y. ANN. REP. 53 (1952).
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ment should the respondent fail to carry out his responsibilities un-
der the agreement.7
During the conciliation stage, the complainant is normally given
no right to participate in the adjustment of the claim, despite the
fact that the agreement will ultimately have the greatest effect
on him." He has no right to seek judicial review of the commis-
sion's acts during conciliation, or of the agreement itself. However,
there is some authority to the effect that the complainant may seek
court action if his complaint is erroneously dismissed during the con-
ciliation process,"8 or he may be able to seek extraordinary relief to
protect against arbitrary administrative action.7" Similarly, the re-
spondent is in no position to challenge the commission's action in
initiating the conciliation proceedings;"0 he has no right to seek judi-
cial review at this stage and he can challenge commission action only
by risking a public hearing. This is justifiable not only because re-
view proceedings would put an enormous burden on already over-
loaded commission staffs, but in addition would have an adverse effect
on the flexibility of the entire conciliation process.
(d) Hearing and Order.-Failure of the parties to reach an
agreement at the conciliation stage usually results in a public hear-
76. It is suggested that this method of policing agreements be expanded by administra-
tive means, and wherever possible by statute. See Rabkin, supra note 53, at 109.
Ideally, therefore, every conciliation agreement should be structured to achieve four
results, namely: (1) provide an equitable solution for the complainant; (2) eliminate
any broad patterns of discrimination discovered while investigating the specific claim;
(3) prevent respondent from engaging in future discriminatory practices; and (4)
assure compliance with the terms of the agreement before dosing the case.
77. In addition, the complainant may not normally dismiss his petition without
commission approvaL See, e.g., CONNECTICUT COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RULES
AND REGULATIONS art. II, § 6 (1947).
78. See Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d 882, 173 N.Y.S.2d 597(1958). There is also a question of whether an aggrieved person ought to be given
the right to compel the commission to investigate, conciliate, and adjudicate a claim,
and if so whether such a right should be reinforced by the right to seek review of a
refusal to do so. On the one hand, it is argued that only the commission "should
have the power to control the deployment of its limited resources of men and energy."
Girard & Jaffe, sapra note 44, at 119. On the other hand, it is admitted that such an
approach "does place an enormous power in the hands of an agency, and where there
are no alternatives opened to an aggrieved person, it is a questionable policy." Ibid.
Therefore, it has been suggested "that the agency's refusal to proceed should not be
subject to judicial control, but that the aggrieved person should have a right to proceed
on his own in court if the agency refuses to act." Id. at 119-20.
79. See Comment, supra note 47, at 859 nn. 179 & 180.
80. But just as in the case of arbitrary administrative action with respect to the claim
of an aggrieved individual, the respondent too may be able to secure extraordinary relief.
See Freund v. Commission, 128 N.Y.L.J. 1446, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
81. Most states have provisions for a hearing in advance of the conciliation and per-
suasion process if the commission finds that such is warranted. See, e.g., OHno REv.
CODE § 4112.05(B).
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ing.8' At this stage, the commission makes findings of fact which
become the basis for either a dismissal of the case or the issuance of
a cease and desist order.12  This order may be directed to the single
incident of discrimination as set forth in the aggrieved individual's
complaint, or it may be focused on any broad pattern of discrimina-
tion found by the commission during its investigation."8 In all states
with FEP laws, the respondent is given the right to appeal from the
hearing board's decision. Most statutes also give the complainant a
similar right to seek review of a commission order.84 Enforcement
of commission orders is available by exercise of the contempt power
of the courts.8"
The greatest criticism of contemporary hearing procedures in-
volves the propriety of combining initiation, conciliation, and ad-
judication functions in the same body. "Generally speaking, our
tradition is against combining the functions of prosecution and ad-
judication in the same officers or organization. One who prosecutes
a claim is apt to look at evidence with an eye to confirm his prose-
cutory intention."8 6 A similar question is raised by combining con-
ciliation or arbitral functions with adjudication. "An arbitrator who
has attempted to conciliate may learn certain things or may acquire
certain attitudes toward one or the other party which, when he be-
comes a judge, distorts his application of the law to the facts."8"
82. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4112.05(G), (H).
83. See, e.g., Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954), wherein
the New York Commission found that an employment agency had unlawfully ques-
tioned a job applicant about her national origin. The commission issued a cease and
desist order not only as to the unlawful practice complained of, but also prohibited the
agency from making an inquiry respecting race, religion, color, or national origin in all
future job applications. In addition, the agency was directed (1) not to furnish any
information to prospective employers respecting an applicant's race, creed, color, or
national origin; (2) not to accept any job orders containing limitations or specifications
on such account; (3) to maintain records of action taken on all job applications; and
(4) make available such records until such time as the commission should determine
that the agency was complying with the statute.
84. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, op. cit. supra note 42, at 61.
85. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.06(F).
86. Girard & Jaffe, supra note 44, at 118. See also KONviTz & LESKES, A CEN-
TURY OF CIL RIGHTS 203 (1962). In New York, the commission rules provide
that "hearings shall be conducted by three members of the Commission designated by
the Chairman, but the Investigating Commissioner who caused the notice of hearing
to be issued shall not be designated as a Hearing Commissioner." N.Y. STATE COMM'N
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7(b) (1953).
A discussion of this same problem occurred when the Senate was considering the proper
role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in enforcement of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 110 CONG. REC. 13693-95 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
87. Girard & Jaffe, supra note 44, at 118. These writers point out, however, "that
the values of combining prosecutory and adjudicatory functions have sometimes (as for
instance, with the National Labor Relations Board and Federal Trade Commission)
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The solution to both problems may lie in appointing an independent
trial examiner to conduct the hearing and make the report without
the aid of consultation with the prosecutory staff."8
(e) Judicial Review.-Since the primary purpose of the com-
missions is to adjust complaints by conciliation and persuasion, there
has been very little litigation in the state courts concerning state FEP
laws." Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc.,"0 was the first court test of a
state fair employment practices law. There, the respondent appealed
from an order to cease and desist from refusing to hire the com-
plainant because of his race on the grounds that: (1) the applicant
for employment should have been made a party to the proceeding;
(2) the findings made by the hearing board were arbitrary and con-
trary to law and fact; and (3) the order was too broad. The Con-
necticut court's holding on these points forms the basis for most of
the present rules applicable to judicial review of commission action.
With respect to the first point, it was held that the procedure es-
tablished by FEP laws was intended to make the commission the
adversary of the employer; hence the complainant was held to have
no right or interest in the proceeding which would make him a
necessary party. 1 In answer to respondent's second contention, the
court established a rule which still persists today that the findings of
fact upon which the hearing tribunal predicated its order are binding
on the court unless a reading of the total record reveals that the com-
mission acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 2 Finally, in response to
been thought to outweigh its disadvantages ...... Id. at 118. Nevertheless, the
observation is made that the trend is otherwise. "The Labor Board now has a prosecut-
ing arm distinct from the members of the Board, and the Administrative Procedure Act
has provisions which attempt to mitigate the disadvantages of combination." Ibid.
88. See Girard & Jaffe, supra note 44, at 118-19.
89. A recent study by the Senate Labor Committee showed that of the more than
19,000 complaints filed in 13 states from the inception of the laws in those states until
December 1961, only 18 resulted in court actions. 110 CONG. REc. 6987 (daily ed.
April 8, 1964).
90. 17 Conn. Supp. 93 (Super. Ct. 1950).
91. Id. at 96.
92. See OHIo REv. CODE § 4112.06 (E) wherein it is provided that "the findings of
the commission as to the facts shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence
on the record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted considered as a
whole." See also Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d 882, 173 N.Y.S.2d
597 (1958); Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954); Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Commission, 140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953).
The judicial function is said to be exhausted when a rational basis is found for the
conclusions approved by the commission. Delaney v. Conway, 39 Misc. 2d 499, 502,
241 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1963). However, one court has reversed a commis-
sion finding of no probable cause to support a complaint. American Jewish Congress
v. Carter, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
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the respondent's third contention, the court established the principle
that even if the commission's finding of discrimination is upheld, the
court, in contrast to the usual judicial review of administrative
orders, has the power to modify the commission's order and enter
any new order that the commission could have issued."
C. Constitutionality of FEP Laws
(1) The Conflict of Rights.-Fair employment practices laws
raise a question of constitutionality in the clash of two basic rights:
the right of an employer to choose who will work for him, and the
right of an individual to be free from arbitrary restrictions on his
opportunity to be employed on account of race, religion, color, or
national origin. 4 In the only case to come before the United States
Supreme Court involving a constitutional challenge of a state statute
forbidding racial discrimination, the Court unanimously held that
such a statute offends neither the due process clause nor the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, in Railway
Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,5 the Court held that there is "no constitutional
basis for the contention that a state cannot protect workers from ex-
clusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed by an organization,
93. In Draper, the commission ordered Clark Dairy to cease and desist from refus-
ing to hire the complainant, Oscar S. Draper. However, the court was of the opinion
that in the seven month period between the date of the unfair employment practice
and the commission's order, intervening factors might have made employment of the
complainant by the respondent impossible. Thus, the court modified the commission's
order to read: "In the event that Oscar S. Draper ... presents himself for employment,
you are hereby ordered to cease and desist from refusing, because of his race, to employ
him." Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 17 Conn. Supp. 93, 101 (Super. Ct. 1950). See
also Holland v. Edwards, 282 App. Div. 353, 122 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1953), afl'd, 307
N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
94. It was early recognized in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888),
that employment "upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances of
the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade . . .is an essential part of...
liberty and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Likewise, in
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court stated that "it requires no argument
to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the com-
munity is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the Amendment to secure." Accordingly, the Court found that if employment
"could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of
words." Id. at 41.
95. 326 U.S. 88 (1945). At issue in the Corsi case was a New York statute forbid-
ding employment discrimination as applied to labor union admission to membership.
The association claimed that the law was a denial of due process in that it interfered
with the union's right to choose its own members. In addition, the association claimed
that application of the statute abridged their property rights and liberty of contract.
The constitutionality of fair employment legislation as applied to an employer has not
been treated directly in any reported appellate court decision. See Robison, Survey of
1959 Ohio Legislation: The New Pair Employment Law, 20 OHio ST. L.J. 570, 580
(1959); 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 572 (1960).
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functioning under the protection of the state, which holds itself out
to represent the general business needs of employees."9
It is important to note, however, that state FEP laws do not force
an employer to hire employees, or a labor union to accept members
because they belong to a particular minority or religious group. 7
Rather, such laws merely demand that the same criteria for employ-
ment or union membership be applied to all persons, regardless of
their race, religion, or color. As one writer put it: "[TIhe right [is]
of a group to pursue an occupation without discriminating exclusion
by law, and not the right of an individual to a particular job against
the free choice of the proposed employer; a right which may be exer-
cised by independent preference, and not a right which involves the
concurrence of another person. To hold that Chinese laundries
must be free to operate on equal terms with others in the same busi-
ness is quite different from holding that Yick Wo cannot be refused
a job in a laundry simply because he is of Chinese origin."9 8
(2) Legislation Based on Police Power.-State FEP laws are
considered valid by most authorities as a reasonable exercise of the
state's police power; 9 this is sufficient to make such laws constitu-
96. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, supra note 95, at 94. It has been stated that "under-
lying. this statement is the basic assumption that there is i privilege to discriminate,'but
that this- can be superseded since the- union was under the state's protection and. was
holding itself out to all eligible. employees." 5 RAcE REL L REp. 573 (1960). This
interpretation receives perhaps even greater significance in light of Justice Frankfurter's
statement in the case that "certainly the insistence by individuals on their private preju-
dices as. to race, color or-creed, in relations like those now before us, ought not to have
a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a Stare to extend the area
of non-discrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts." Railway Mail
Ass'n v..Corsi, supra at 98.
97. Section 703 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Star. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000
e-2 (j-) is. directed specifically to this situation. In essence, it provides that nothing in
the act requires that preferential treatment be given any individual because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. . For further discussion of this, section of the
federal act see note 197 infra.
98. Waite, Constitutionality of the Proposed Minnesota Fair Employment Practices
Act, 32 MiNN. L REv. .349, 357 (1948). As a footnote, to this proposition, it is
interesting to consider the approach taken by a dissenting judge in a recent Wisconsin
case with respect to court "inaction" in the face of private discrimination. In Ross v
Ebert, 275 Wis. 532, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957) (dissent), it was stated: "It may also fol-
low that when a state court denies relief to persons excluded from the equal protection
of the law by a labor union, such denial is itself a violation of the Fourteenth amend-
ment. In any event, however, the granting of relief to plaintiffs by a court would pro-
tect their rights under the Fourteenth amendment and that fact alone is a sufficient basisfor such action by the court." Id. at 536, 82 N.W.2d at 322. (Emphasis added.) The
majority in this case had refused to grant relief to plaintiffs because the statute did not
expressly declare discrimination in employment to be illegal. The dissenting judge's
approach goes beyond the holding in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), but finds
some support in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and Rice v. Sioux City Ceme-
tery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
99. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Hearings on
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tional as against claimed deprivations of liberty of contract and free-
dom of association."' But since only a reasonable exercise of po-
lice power to protect the public welfare, health, and peace will be
sustained,1"' the determinative question is whether fair employment
legislation comes within the purview of providing for the general
welfare. More specifically, the question to be asked is whether dis-
crimination in employment is detrimental to the public generally.
One writer has adopted an economic theory as to the public interest
in nondiscrimination laws: "It is never sensible or right for a nation
to waste valuable human resources through failure to develop or
utilize them. The consequences of such waste are a lower level of
national strength and individual well-being."' 2
III. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY UNDER
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. Legislative History of Title Vii
Any discussion of the evolution of Title VII of the 1964 Act
cannot be confined to an examination of the various bills introduced
in Congress.0 3 For purposes of this analysis, however, the most
S. 101 and S. 459, Pair Employment Practice Act, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1945);
KONVITZ & LEsKEs, A CENTURY OF CIL RIGHTS 219 (1961); Dublirer, Legislation
Outlawing Racial Discrimination in Employment, 5 LAw GUILD REv. 101 (1945);
Elson & Schanfield, Local Regulation of Discriminatory Employment Practices, 56
YALE L.J. 431 (1947); Hunt, The Proposed Pair Employment Practice Act; Facts and
Fallacies, 32 VA. L REV. 1 (1945); Mittenthal, The Michigan Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act, Mich. St. B.J., May 1956, p. 41; Robison, supra note 95, at 580-81; Waite,
supra note 98, at 349; Comment, 56 YALE LJ. 837, 846-48 (1947); 5 RACE REL. L
REP. 572 (1960); Legislation, 17 U. PIrr. L. REV. 438 (1956); Legislation, 14 U.
PITT. L REV. 604 (1953).
100. KONVrrZ & LESKES, op. cit. supra note 99, at 220; Waite, supra note 98, at
353.
101. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
102. GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTENTIAL 116 (1956). A similar attitude was
adopted by President Eisenhower's Committee on Government Contract Compliance.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, EQUAL ECONOMIC Op-
PORTUNITY 54 (1953). See also Pasley, The Nondiscrimination Clause in Govern-
ment Contracts, 43 VA. L. REV. 837 (1957).
103. It could be said that the most appropriate starting point is the statement in the
Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal, endowed by their creator
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." However, one of the first legislative proposals to give FEP statutory status
was introduced by Congressman Vito Marcantonio in 1943. BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 17-18 (1964). Many similar bills were
introduced between 1943 and the present 1964 Act, only one of which got to the floor of
the House. FEP legislation suffered similar flounderings in the Senate. In 1964, Senator
Chavez of New Mexico introduced a bill which reached the Senate floor, but a cloture
motion failed and no vote was taken on the merits of the legislation. Similar legisla-
tion in 1950 never came to a vote as a result of disagreement on enforcement proce-
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appropriate starting point is the sweeping Executive Order 1092510,
issued by President Kennedy in March of 1961. This new executive
order made a dramatic break from the feeble efforts of previous ad-
ministrations.' It was limited, however, to equal opportunity in
government employment and on government contracts. Therefore,
the call was for federal legislation that would reach beyond discrimi-
nation in employment by government contractors and subcontractors
in federally assisted programs.'
The Civil Rights Act of 1963 transmitted to Congress by Presi-
dent Kennedy in June of 1963 did not contain such an employment
title; the only provision made in the omnibus bill was for specific
statutory support for executive action taken under Executive Order
10925. The subsequent administration bill, introduced as H.R.
7152 by Congressman Celler, did, however, contain an employment
title with teeth in it. But when the bill arrived in the hands of the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, these em-
ployment provisions were deleted entirely and inserted in their place
was H.R. 405."7 In turn, the subcommittee bill was revised by the
full committee with the participation of the Justice Department.'
dures. Except for those times, no bill reached the floor of either the Senate or the
House. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAM, op. cit. supra at 18-19.
104. 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
105. While the earlier orders (see notes 18-23 supra) imposed an obligation on gov-
ernment contractors not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, color, or national
origin, the Kennedy order gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee specific
enforcement powers. For a further discussion of the-basic changes effected by Execu-
tive Order 10925, see Birnbaum, Equal Employment Opportunity and Executive Order
10925, 11 KAN. L REV. 17 (1962).
106. See generally Ferguson, The Federal Interest in Employment Discrimination:
Herein The Constitutional Scope of Executive Power to Withhold Appropriate Funds,
14 BUFFALOL. REV. 1 (1964).
107. The subcommittee had arrived at tentative decisions on the phraseology of all
titles of H.R. 7152 at the time the tax reduction bill, H.R. 8363, was being debated on
the floor of the House. "At that time a curious change in atmosphere of subcommittee
consideration abruptly took place. Nonpartisan harmony evaporated. A rigidity of
position based on the possession of an overwhelming majority of votes (seven Demo-
crats to four Republicans) prevailed. Tentative decisions suddenly became permanent
and unchangeable. Alternatives to title and sections were rejected out of hand." H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1963) (remarks of Representative Meader).
It was at this point that H.R. 405, an equal employment opportunity bill which had
already been favorably reported out of the House Education and Labor Committee and
which was awaiting action by the Rules Committee was added.
108. The only major revision of the subcommittee's bill concerned the enforcement
procedures which were changed from the administrative type of cease and desist order
to a de novo proceeding in court, initiated by the Commission. This was the enforce-
ment structure that had been adopted by the Education and Labor Committee in a sim-
ilar equal employment opportunity bill, H.R. 10144, which had been reported out of
the committee in the previous Congress, H.R. REP. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1962).
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Title VII was finally reported from the House Judiciary Committee
to the floor of the House where serious attempts were made to
weaken several of its provisions. Paradoxically, however, the tide
emerged from the House even broader in scope than the committee
version. Despite opposition from the administration and principal
spokesmen for the bill, the House added a provision outlawing dis-
crimination on account of sex.10 9
In the Senate, the bill bypassed the Senate Judiciary Committee
and proceeded directly to debate."0 It was passed only after cloture
had been successfully invoked against two filibusters"' and another
complete revision made." 2 The Senate version of Title VII, or the so-
called compromise bill,"' differs from the House-passed bill in three
respects:" 4 (1) in the area of enforcement, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission was deprived of the right to bring civil
suits to obtain compliance, and in its place was substituted an indi-
vidual right of action by the person aggrieved;" 5 (2) the relation-
ship between state FEP laws and Title VII was modified by a require-
ment that complainants resort first to state procedures where they
exist, but after sixty days a complaint may be filed under the federal
109. See 110 CONG. REc. 2707-08 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1964); 110 CONG. REc. 2484-
92 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964).
110. In the normal course of procedure, H.R. 7152 would have been referred to the
Senate Judiciary which had already buried the companion bill, S. 1731. However, the
supporters of the legislation short-stopped the bill and the Senate immediately began
debate on a motion to take up the bill. See 110 CONG. REc. 6244 (daily ed. March 26,
1964).
111. This was the first time cloture had been successfully invoked in the Senate. This
phenomenon must be taken into consideration in any attempt to understand the amend-
ments to the bill adopted in the Senate. Most significant, perhaps, is the fact that many
of the provisions now in Title VII, many of which are redundant, were put there in an
effort to satisfy certain Senators so as to achieve the wide measure of support necessary
to obtain cloture.
112. For a comparative analysis of the Senate and House bills see 110 CONG. REC.
15453-58 (daily ed. July 6, 1964).
113. The compromise bill was hammered out by bipartisan negotiations among the
bill's supporters, principally Senators Dirksen and Humphrey in consultation with the
Attorney General. The compromise took the form of an amendment substituting a
completely revised bill for that passed by the House.
114. See 110 CONG. REc. 12295 (daily ed. June 4, 1964) (Senator Humphrey's
explanation of Title VII).
115. This was perhaps the most significant change made in Title VII. It represented
a basic change in the philosophy of the title through an implied appraisal of discrimina-
tion as a private rather than a public wrong. However, some of this loss was regained
by the inclusion of a new section in Title VII authorizing the Attorney General to bring
suit where there is "a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment" of the rights




act;.. 6 and (3) the broad authority of the Commission to conduct in-
vestigations and require record keeping was limited by exempting
certain businesses and labor organizations from its coverage." 7 On
return to the House, the bill again received preferential treatment,
and after one hour of debate the House passed the amended version
of H.R. 7152.
B. Analysis of Title VII
(1) Coverage of the Title.-In general terms, the coverage of
Title VII appears to be intended to reach as far as Congress' power
over commerce." 8 The statutory boundaries are set forth in a
series of interlocking definitions in sections 701,"1 702,120 and
703. "  The key is activity or industry affecting commerce. The
term "commerce" is defined in section 701 (g) as meaning essen-
tially interstate commerce.' 22  The phrase "industry affecting com-
merce" is defined in section 701(h) 23 as including everything af-
fecting commerce as defined in the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959,24 which in turn incorporates the defi-
nition of "affecting commerce" in the National Labor Relations
116. This change was provoked by fear on the part of many Senators that the federal
Commission would be unwilling to abandon its jurisdiction voluntarily. Thus, it was
urged by Senator Dirksen and others that the title contain greater protection for the
jurisdktion of state and local agencies., See 110 CONG. REC. 12383 (daily ed. June
5, 1964) (Senator Dirksen's explanation of Title VII).
117. 'Senator Humphrey explained that the a'uthority granted the federal Commission
"has been limited . . . to prevent duplication of recordkeeping requirements. Where
the employer, agency, organization, or committee is also subject to a State fair em-
ployment practice law, the Commission may not prescribe general recordkeeping re-
quirements. Instead, it may require such notations on existing records. . , as are neces-
sary because of the differences in methods of enforcement or of coverage between the
State and the Federal law." 110 CONG. REc. 12296 <daily -ed. June 4, 1964).
118. As Senator Humphrey explained: "The constitutional basis for'title VII, is, of
course, the commerce clause. The courts have held time and again that the commerce
clause authorizes Congress to enact legislation to regulate employment relations which
affect interstate and foreign commerce." .110 CONG. REc. 6328 (daily ed. March 30,
1964).
119. 78 Stat 253, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e (1964).
120. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-1 (1964).
121. 78 Star. 255, 42 U:S.C.A. 5 2000e-2 (1964).
122. 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e(g) (1964). Interstate commerce also in-
cludes commerce within the District of Columbia and the possessions. See § 701 (i), 78
Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (i) (1964), which defines the term "state" as "a State
of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Ameri-
can Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands
defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act."
123. 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e(h) (1964).
124. 73 Star. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. 1, 1959).
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Act.125 The courts have yet to delineate the phrase "industry af-
fecting commerce" as defined in the NLRA in any quantitative
terms." Thus, it would appear that the full sweep of Title VII will
be as broad as the courts are willing to make it.'
The term "employer" as used in Title VII is equally as broad.
Two sections are pertinent: section 701 (b) 2 defines "employer,"
and section 701 (a) 2 defines "person." Whether a person is an
employer under Title VII is also dependent upon: (1) the number
of employees on the payroll; 3 ' and (2) the number of calendar
weeks such employees worked in the preceding or current calendar
year.'3 ' When fully effective, the title will be applicable to the
125. 61 STAT. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958).
126. Most courts have merely stated that the NLRA represents an exercise of Con-
gress' regulatory power to the broadest possible extent. E.g., NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963), wherein it is stated that the NLRA is an exercise of
regulatory power to "the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under
the Commerce Clause." See also Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
127. There has been some question raised, however, as to whether certain situations
might not fall within the doctrine of de minimus non curat lex. For example, some
employers, unions, or employment agencies might raise the issue that their activity
has at most only a trivial effect on interstate commerce; that their operations are con-
fined strictly within the borders of a single state and they are thus concerned very little,
if at all, with other enterprises which are "in commerce" or "affect commerce." How-
ever, it would seem that Congress was aware of this situation, but found that in the
circumstances of our modern economy, it would be a rare case where business activity did
not "affect commerce" to at least some degree. As Senator Clark stated: "It can therefore
be authoritively said that it is now well settled that the constitutional power extends
to activities affecting commerce in any amount or volume not so minimal or sporadic
as to fall within the doctrine of de minimus non curat lex." 110 CONG. REC. 6989
(daily ed. April 8, 1964). Also, in NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-07 (1939),
the Court stated that the "power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary
and extends to all such commerce be it great or small... [because] commerce may be
affected in the same manner and to the same extent in proportion to its volume,
whether it be great or small." Therefore, it would appear that a matter would have
to be trivial indeed to escape the care of the courts. See also NLRB v. Stoller, 207 F.2d
305 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919 (1954); Carpenter's Union v. NLRB,
184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951).
128. 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e(b) (1964).
129. 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e(a) (1964).
130. Section 701(b),'78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e(b) (1964). An "em-
ployee" is defined in § 701(f), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (1964), "as an
individual employed by an employer." Therefore, by definition, applicants for em-
ployment are excluded. However, this omission would seem to be of no particular
significance since § 703(a) (1), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1964),
makes it unlawful to "refuse to hire.. any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " It does not matter what kind of work
the employee does: supervisors, company presidents, confidential secretaries, guards, and
management personnel generally are not excluded or given special status as they are
under either express provision or policy of the NLRA. However, Congress did not
intend that members of a corporation's board of directors, nor a corporation's stock-
holders be employers for purposes of Title VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 6997 (daily ed.
April 8, 1964).
131. Section 701(b), 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1964).
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practices of employers of more than twenty-five employees; how-
ever, this will not be achieved until July 2, 1968. The minimum
provisions of the tide become effective July 2, 1965.13 With
respect to the second requirement, that of length of time em-
ployed, there has been some question as to interpretation. Section
701 (b) provides that the employees must have been working for
the employer "for each working day in each of twenty or more cal-
endar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. .... "" The
question thus raised is whether coverage is continuous, or, on the
other hand, is applicable only while the employer has the requisite
number of employees. By way of example, suppose that a seasonal
employer has fewer than the requisite number of employees on the
day he begins hiring; that his cumulative seasons during the year
amount to twenty weeks or more; but that for only three weeks out
of this twenty or more week season does he have the requisite num-
ber of employees. A literal reading of section 701 (b) would indi-
cate that an employer must have the requisite number of employees
for the requisite period of twenty weeks to be covered by the tide.
Thus, in the example, the employer with the requisite number of em-
ployees for only the three week period would escape coverage. On
the other hand, there is some indication that coverage is continuous,
i.e., hiring and personnel practices during a slack season are covered
although at that time the employer had fewer than the number of
employees set forth in section 701 (b).134
Employment agencies, regardless of size, are covered by the pro-
132. Section 701(b), 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1964), provides the
schedule of effective dates. From July 2, 1965 to July 1, 1966, the critical number of
employees is 100. This minimum is lowered to 75 during the second year (July 2, 1966
to July 1, 1967), to 50 during the third year (July 2, 1967 to July 1, 1968), and be-
comes fully effective covering employers with 25 or more employees on July 2, 1968.
133. 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e(b) (1964).
134. Doubt shed on the literal language of the statute comes by way of a question and
answer memorandum placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Clark in response
to questions from Senator Dirksen. The latter Senator posed the following hypothetical
and questions: "[Ajssume if you will the operation of a medium-size orchard. For
11 V2 months of the year the employer -has no employees. But during 2 weeks of the
year he employs 100 pickers. Is he to be subjected to the provisions of this tide?
What of summer or winter resort operations where employment is only for 2 or 3
months at the most. Are they to be covered by this titie? Certainly we have no clear
statement by which an employer can be guided. Is this the way to legislate?" 110
CONG. REc. 6996 (daily ed. April 8, 1964). Senator Clark's response was: "Employers
whose staffs fluctuate seasonally are covered by the act at times when the number of em-
ployees exceeds the minimum figure; they are not covered when it is below the minimum."
Ibid. It is not dear, however, whether this reply was directed to the House bill, which
did not include the 20-week standard, or the Illinois statute which Senator Dirksen had
referred to in his questions and which is in essence what finally appears in the final ver-
sion of the 1964 Act.
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visions of Title VII if they regularly procure employees for covered
employers.135 Thus, whether an employment agency is covered by
the title is determined by the nature of its customers rather than by
the nature of the agency itself.'36 If the employer for whom the
agency procures employees carries on business activity which can be
said to affect commerce, then this fact alone brings the agency within
the scope of the title. In addition, the United States Employment
Service and all state and local employment services receiving federal
assistance are prohibited from classifying, failing or refusing to refer,
or otherwise discriminating against any individual.'37
Labor organizations... are covered by the title on two bases:
(1) if they have the requisite number or more members according
to the four year sliding scale," 9 and are (a) certified under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act, (b) recog-
nized by a covered employer, or (c) related to a covered labor or-
ganization, as a chartered, chartering, or joint-interest labor organi-
zation;.4 ° or (2) if they maintain a hiring hall that procures em-
ployees for a covered employer, regardless of whether the member-
ship of the labor organization meets the otherwise applicable mini-
mum.'
4 1
135. Section 703(b), 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(b) (1964), provides that
"it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse
to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment
any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
136. Section 701 (c), 78 Stat. 254, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(c) (1964), defines the term
"employment agency" as "any person regularly undertaking with or without compen-
sation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities
to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person ....
137. Ibid.
138. The definition of a "labor organization" in § 701 (d), 78 Stat. 254, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e(d) (1964), is lifted verbatim from the Landrum-Griffin Act and includes
"any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee,
group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employ-
ment .... "
139. Labor organizations are subject to the same three year gradual inclusion pro-
vision found in the section dealing with employers discussed previously at note 132
supra and accompanying text.
140. Section 701(e) (2), 78 Star. 254, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(e)(2) (1964).
141. Section 701 (e) (1), 78 Stat. 254, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(e) (1) (1964). This
provision did not appear in the bill as it passed the House. It was added in the Senate,
and according to Senator Humphrey was included because "wherever a labor organiza-
tion maintains a hiring hail which supplies workers for employers covered by the title,
that labor organization is deemed to affect commerce and is covered by the title." 110
CONG. REC. 12297 (daily ed. June 4, 1964). The best statement of the thrust of this
provision may be found in Senator Clark's memorandum in which he recorded both
Senator Dirksen's inquiries and his responses to those inquiries. Senator Dirksen ques-
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(2) Exemptions from the Title.-The basic exemptions from
Title VII are found in three sections. First, section 701 (b)142 ex-
cludes, by definition, all governmental units,' corporations wholly
owned by the United States Government, Indian tribes," and
private membership clubs.'45 Explicit exemptions are provided
in section 702 for: (1) "a religious corporation, association,
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
... of its religious activities...,";46 (2) "an educational institution
with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work con-
tioned: "If an employer obtains his employees from a union hiring hall through opera-
tion of his labor contract is he in fact the true employer from the standpoint of dis-
crimination because of race, color, religion, or national origin when he exercises no
choice in their selection? If the hiring hall sends only white males is the employer
guilty of discrimination within the meaning of this title? If he is not, then further
safeguards must be provided to protect him from endless prosecution under the au-
thority of this title." 110 CONG. REC. 6996 (daily ed. April 8, 1964). Senator Clark
replied that "an employer who obtains his employees from a union hiring hall through
operation of a labor contract is still an employer. If the hiring hall discriminates
against Negroes, and sends him only whites, he is not guilty of discrimination - but
the union hiring hall would be." Ibid.
142. 78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1964).
143. Senator Byrd, an opponent of the legislation, pointed out that this did not leave
federal and state governmental bodies free to discriminate with respect to public em-
ployment opportunities. "The former is covered by the President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunities; the latter is covered by the equal protection clause of the
14th amendment." 110 CONG. REC. 12803 (daily ed. June 10, 1964).
144. Indians will receive preferential treatment under Title VII, perhaps by reason of
their historic relationship with the federal government, or more likely because of the
Government's concern with employment opportunities for Indians. Thus, they will
receive both the protections of the title and immunity from its prohibitions. Section
703(i), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (i) (1964), also gives preferential treat-
ment to Indians by way of its provision that "nothing contained in this title shall apply
to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly
announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a prefer-
ential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near
a reservation."
145. Whether a dub is exempt under Title VII is determined by whether it would be
"exempt froia taxation under section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."
78 Star. 253, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (1964).
146. Section 702, 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (1964). The exemption for
religious institutions was originally much broader. The bill as reported from the House
Judiciary Committee provided simply that "this title shall not apply to ... a religious
corporation association, or society." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess.
(1963). The language limiting the exemption to work which is necessary to the es-
sential nature of the institution was added by the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise in the
Senate. However, the exemption as finally passed is so narrowly drawn that one writer
has been led to observe "that it does not appear to permit discrimination in the selection
of clergy on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin. [But), if the tenets of a
particular faith require such discrimination, a prohibition of such discrimination would
seem to be an interference with the free exercise of religion." Berg, Equal Employment
Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L REv. 62, 70 n.13
(1964).
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nected with the educational activities of such institution;""'n and
(3) employers, otherwise covered, with respect to aliens they employ
in lands other than those described in section 701 (i) as "states.' '1 48
Other employers are also exempt from the operation of Title VII by
exculpation of certain behavior as provided in section 703.149
(3) Proscribed Practices Under Title VII.-There are basically
five proscribed bases of discrimination set forth in Title VII, name-
ly: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.' These interdic-
tions are in turn directed primarily to three types of entities: em-
ployers, employment agencies, and labor organizations. For pur-
poses of proper analysis, it would be well to consider each of these
three entities separately in light of the five proscribed bases of dis-
crimination which affect them.
Title VII will undoubtedly have its greatest impact on the first
of the three above named entities - employers. Section 703 (a)'5'
sets out the statutory boundaries here. Subdivision (1) of that sec-
tion relates to hiring and firing, making it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any indi-
vidual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment."152  Determining whether such practices have occurred and
147. Section 702, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (1964).
148. Section 702, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (1964). However, overseas
employment of indigenous personnel may be subject to special agreement, treaty, or
laws of the host country beyond United States jurisdiction.
149. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1964). For a further discussion of this
section see pp. 644-48 infra.
150. The bill sent to the House Judiciary Committee made it unlawful to discrimi-
nate against an individual because of his race, color, religion, national origin, or an-
cestry. The bill reported to the House by the full Judiciary Committee, however,
dropped the word "ancestry." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 87
(1963). It is also interesting to note that during the debate of Title VII in the House,
an amendment was offered by Congressman Dowdy of Texas to add "age" to the pro-
scribed bases of discrimination. Congressman Dowdy argued that "age" more than
any other factor is the most frequently seized upon by an employer to reject job
applicants and hence was the "worst kind of discrimination." 110 CONG. REC. 2503
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964). The amendment failed, but the measure was not dropped.
It found its way into what is now § 715, 78 Star. 265, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-14 (1964),
which requires the Secretary of Labor to make a "full and complete study of the factors
which might tend to result in discrimination in employment because of age and of the
consequences of such discrimination on the economy and individuals affected." The
Secretary of Labor is required to report back to Congress not later than June 30, 1965
as to the results of such study and any "recommendations for legislation to prevent
arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age as he determines advisable."
151. 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
152. 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1964). The latter prohibitions
as to employment conditions are broad and would seem to encompass virtually all aspects
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whether the complainant is entitled to relief will be a matter of evi-
dence,"5 3 and the rules applied will presumably be similar to those
applicable under the National Labor Relations Act, i.e., the burden
of going forward will rest initially with the claimant, but may be
shifted by persuasive evidence of discrimination.'M
It is also an unlawful employment practice under section 703
(a) (2) for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin." ' This section is apparently di-
rected to such practices as maintaining separate seniority rosters for
male and female or white and Negro, or the designation of cer-
tain jobs as male, female, Negro, or white.
Employment agencies are also singled out for specific attention
under Title VII because of their key position in the hiring process.
Section 703 (b) is aimed directly at employment agencies that "fail
of the employer-employee relationship. But more confusing, perhaps, will be the scope
of the terms "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Some
guidance may be obtained from similar language in the NLRA, or with respect to com-
pensation, in the Fair Labor Standards Act. As to the physical environment in which
an employee works, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity has
taken the position that the obligation not to discriminate extends to such facilities as
rest rooms, lunch rooms, and drinking fountains. See Birnbaum, Equal Employment
Opportunity and Executive Order 10923, 11 KAN. L. REV. 17 (1962). The same at-
titudes would presumably apply under Title VII.
153. There has been some question as to whether Title VII requires a showing of
intent to engage in unlawful employment practices before judicial relief is available.
Section 706(g), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) (1964), provides that such
relief is available only if the court finds that "the respondent has intentionally engaged
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice." This provision
did not appear in the House version, but was added as a part of the leadership com-
promise. Its effect is ambiguous, for it does not seem possible to "unintentionally"
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Directing his
comments to this section, Senator Humphrey stated that discrimination on account of the
proscribed bases "would seem already to require intent, and, thus, the proposed change
does not involve any substantive change in the title. The express requirement of intent
is designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or accidental discriminations will
not violate the title or result in entry of court orders. It means simply that the respon-
dent must have intended to discriminate." 110 CoNG. REc. 12298 (daily ed. June 4,
1964). If this interpretation of the term "intentionally" is accepted, a further question
arises as to whether defenses based on ignorance of the law, good faith belief that the
respondent was not covered by the title, or that the discrimination was based on a bona
fide occupational qualification would be allowable. It would seem to this writer that
they would.
154. See NLRB v. Chicago Steel Foundry Co., 142 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1944); West-
ern Cartridge Co. v. NIRE, 139 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1943); NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg.
Co., 120 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 108 F.2d 288 (4th
Cir. 1939).
155. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (a) (2) (1964).
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or refuse to refer for employment.., any individual because of his
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.... "156  Section 704(b),
which is also directed primarily at employment agencies, makes it un-
lawful to indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or make
mention of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in printing or
publishing any employment notice or advertisement. 157  However,
this does not require the advertising medium which publicizes the
employment notice or advertisement to exercise any control or su-
pervision over, or do any screening of, the published material. 55
Labor unions are prohibited from discriminating on two bases,
namely: (1) in their capacity as employers, unions must not violate
any of the prohibitions imposed on employers generally;'59 and
(2) unions have an obligation to refrain from discriminatory prac-
tices as organizations representing employees in their relationships
with employers. 6° With respect to the latter provision, there has
156. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(b) (1964). These prohibitions apply
to private employment agencies as well as to the United States Employment Service and
state and local employment services that receive federal assistance. See text accompany-
ing note 137 supra.
157. 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (b) (1964). This unlawful practice applies
to employers and labor unions as well. Also within the purview of this section is the
regulation of questions that may be put to job applicants. Just as many state PEP laws
have lists of lawful and unlawful questions that may be asked of job applicants, e.g.,
OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N, PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRY GUIDE, 2 CCH LAB. L.
REP. 5 47,575 (1963), so too does § 704(b) impliedly prohibit questions to job ap-
plicants that would cause classification on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
158. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1963).
159. See § 703(c), 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1964).
160. There are basically three proscribed practices falling within this general obliga-
tion: (1) § 703(c) (1), 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c) (1) (1964), makes it
an unlawful employment practice for a labor union "to exclude or to expel from its
membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ... "; (2) § 703 (c) (2), 78 Star. 255, 42 U.S.C-A.
5 2000e-2 (c) (2) (1964), makes it unlawful for a labor union "to limit, segregate, or
classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any
individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... "; and (3) a labor
union is prohibited under § 703(c) (3), 78 Star. 256, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(c)
(3) (1964), from causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of the section. With respect to the latter provision, some guidance
to interpretation may be provided by § 8(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, as amended,
61 Star. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958), which makes it an un-
fair labor practice for a labor union to cause an employer to discriminate against indi-
viduals because of union membership or activities. Thus, in one recent case the NLRB
stated that the test of a violation of § 8(b) (2) is not whether the pressure exerted on
the employer is direct or indirect, but whether the union intended to cause the unlawful
discrimination. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices 'of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting
Indus., 112 N.LR.B. 1385 (1955).
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been some concern as to a possible overlapping of section 703 (c)
and the prohibitions laid down by the NIRB and its doctrine of fair
representation under the Taft-Hartley Act. 6' In this connection,
the recent case of Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.)...
has stimulated strong arguments in favor of extending NLRB juris-
diction in a case of racial discrimination." 3 On the other hand,
161. The courts have included a prohibition against union discrimination in the
NI.RA through the following series of decisions and interpretations. The starting point
is § 9 of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958),
which provides that a union chosen by a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit
shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit. Through the de-
cision in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), the courts have extended
this explicit grant of power to a union to act as exclusive bargaining representative
to include a duty to represent all employees in the unit without discrimination. See
also Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1956). Then, Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), held that
violations of this duty of fair representation could be challenged in unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings. The recent case of Independent Metal Workers (Hughes Tool Co.),
147 NJ.R.B. No. 166 (July 1, 1964), extended application of the Miranda holding
to a case of racial discrimination.
162. 147 N.LR.B. No. 166 (July 1, 1964), noted in 78 HARV. L. REV. 679 (1965).
The action arose out of a Negro's bid for apprenticeship in the Independent Metal
Workers Union. This union was split into two locals, both of which were certified
as bargaining representatives of employees at the Houston plant of the Hughes Tool
Company. Local 1 represented the plant's white employees and Local 2 the Negro em-
ployees. Accordingly, the jobs in the plant were classified into category I ("white
jobs") and category II ("Negro jobs"). In December of 1961, Local 1 and the com-
pany agreed to create six new apprenticeships in category I. Ivory Davis, a Negro, bid
for apprenticeship in this category. The company refused to list Davis on the applica-
tion list because it maintained that he was ineligible for a category I "white job."
Local 1 also refused to intercede on Davis' behalf, whereupon Davis caused unfair labor
practice proceedings to be brought. The Board held that the union's discrimination
against Davis because of his race was a violation of the duty of fair representation and
thus an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A) of the NLRA, as amended, 61
Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1958). The Board also rescinded
Independent's certification.
163. There are essentially two arguments here. First, not all cases of unfair repre-
sentation will be covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the acts of dis-
crimination complained of may not fall within one of the minority groups protected
by the act. Second, even in areas where the 1964 Act does operate, the NLRB is said to
provide more efficient remedies. For example, Robert L. Carter, General Counsel for the
NAACP, has urged Negroes who become victims of employment discrimination not
to depend on the involved machinery of the 1964 Act, but rather to utilize the speedier
remedies offered by the NLRB. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1964, p. 1, col. 6. And there is
justification for this position. Consider the potential delay in an average case when
recourse is sought initially under the act: (1) before the federal Commission may take
any action with respect to a charge of employment discrimination "occurring in a State
or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the prac-
tice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek
relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto," §
706(c) of the 1964 Act, 78 Star. 260, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) (1964), requires the
commission to "notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford
them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days ... to remedy the practice alleged";
(2) once the state has taken the case, "no charge may be filed under [the federal act]
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced tinder
the State or local law... ," § 706(b), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (b) (1964);
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some experts contend that giving the NLRB jurisdiction over such
cases of unfair representation requires "a stretching of existing doc-
trine."' 64 It represents an interpretation of section 7 of the NLRA...
that can be supported by neither the legislative nor judicial history of
the act. Thus, it would seem that the specific prohibitions of Title
VII against racial discrimination ought to limit the application of a
doctrine that was earlier implied out of necessity. Congress has
now made union duties with respect to racial discrimination explicit,
and the federal courts ought not use judicial interpretation to bypass
Congress' explicit declaration of the manner in which it wished em-
ployment discrimination to be redressed. 6 '
Title VII also protects those who seek to invoke or participate
in the law's enforcement processes against retaliation. Based on
the precedents set down under the NLRA and the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act makes it an un-
lawful employment practice for a labor organization, employer, or
employment agency to discriminate against any employee or appli-
cant for employment "because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an in-
vestigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title."' 67
(4) Discrimination on Account of Sex.-Title VII's proscrip-
tion of discrimination on account of sex purports to cause such
untoward difficulties in application that it deserves separate consider-
ation and analysis.' 68 Moreover, no guidance is available from
(3) after expiration of six days and a complaint has been filed with the federal Com-
mission, an attempt is made for thirty days, without public disclosure of the facts of the
grievance, to secure voluntary compliance with the provisions of the act, § 706(e), 78
Star. 260, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (1964); and (4) if "the Commission has been
unable to obtain voluntary compliance ... the Commission shall so notify the person
aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the
respondent named in the charge . 5.. 706(e), 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
5(e) (1964).
164. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM.
L. REv. 563, 593 (1962); see also Note, Administrative Enforcement of the Right to
Fair Representation: The Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1964).
165. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
166. A middle ground is perhaps suggested by a memorandum prepared by the De-
partment of Justice and introduced into the Congressional Record by Senator Clark.
In essence, this memorandum indicates that Title VII's Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the NLRB will occasionally have concurrent jurisdiction. See 110
CONG. REc. 6986 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
167. 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (1964).
168. Consider, for example, a statement opposing the amendment inserted in the rec-
ord by Congressman Celler: "Discrimination based on sex . . . involves problems suf-
ficiently different from discrimination based on the other factors listed to make separate
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Congress here; the sex provisions received sparse debate on the
floors of the House and Senate and thus there is very little to illumi-
nate the peculiar problems that are destined to arise.
The most troublesome area is the possible collision between state
laws regarding employment of women and the Title VII provisions
on the same subject.1"9 In this regard, consideration must first be
given to section 708170 which preserves the effect of state laws ex-
cept where those laws would require or permit the doing of an act
made unlawful under the federal law. Also to be considered here
are the provisions of section 703 (e). 7 which permit discrimina-
tion based on a bona fide occupational qualification. A state law
regulating employment of women would seem to fall somewhere be-
tween these two provisions. There is of course no problem where
a state regulation permitting discrimination on account of sex would
be recognized as a bona fide occupational qualification under the
federal act." 2 But where the only basis for the discrimination is a
state regulation which appears to collide with the spirit if not the
letter of the federal act, a harder case is presented.' If a state law
is in direct conflict with any of the provisions of Title VII, it will
not be tolerated. 4  However, where there is no direct conflict, but
only a question of whether the state regulation is within the scope
of Title VII, section 703 (e), three approaches seem possible. First,
treatment preferable." 110 CONG. REC. 2485 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964). Similarly,
it can be observed from a reading of the limited comment on this subject in the Con-
gressional Record that the amendment was not supported by a majority of those who
favored enactment of Tide VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 2484-92 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1964).
169. Numerous examples are available. Most common are state laws regulating the
working hours of women. Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have laws
regulating the number of daily and/or weekly hours of employment for women. See,
e.g., OHo REV. CODE § 4107.46. Probably the most troublesome problems will arise
over fringe benefits frequently made available only to women, i.e., rest periods, mater-
nity benefits, and earlier retirement benefits. But with respect to the latter privilege,
Senator Humphrey said that the Bennett amendment to § 703(h) made it dear
that differences in industrial benefits, including earlier retirement options for women,
are not prohibited by Tide VII. See 110 CONG. REC. 13185 (daily ed. June 12, 1964).
170. 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-7 (1964).
171. 78 Star. 256, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
172. On this basis, discrimination could presumably be justified in employment in-
volving strenuous activity, hazardous working conditions, such as mining, or close con-
tact with fellow workers. However, even these bases might be suspect under certain
conditions.
173. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 58-1062 (1963), which prohibits employment of
women in liquor stores; OHio REv. CODE § 4107A3, which regulates the amount of
weight a woman may carry. Obviously, both of these laws would have the effect of
prohibiting the employment of women in certain jobs.
174. See § 708, 78 Star. 262, 42 U.S.CA. § 2000e-7 (1964).
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a strict interpretation of the language of section 703 (e) would allow
no weight to be given to the state law, i.e., if the discrimina-
tory practice permitted under the state law is not specifically men-
tioned in section 703 (e) as bona fide, it would fall. At the other
extreme is the approach that section 703 (e) permits discrimination
in compliance with state law, unless the state law is invalid under
the fourteenth amendment.'75 Finally, a middle ground might be
reached by critical examination of the validity of a state law permit-
ting discrimination on account of sex in light of the broad policy in
the federal act of affording equal employment opportunity for both
sexes.
(5) Exceptions to the Prohibitions.-Not all discriminatory
employment practices are made unlawful by Title VII. There are
four very broad exceptions under the title and several narrower
ones. Perhaps the broadest exception, as mentioned earlier, is found
in section 703 (e) 76 which permits employers, employment agen-
cies, and labor organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion,
sex, or national origin "in those certain instances where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise." '177 It is important to note, however, that this ex-
ception does not extend to discrimination on account of race or
color. This is justifiable. As was pointed out in the subcommittee
hearings on the bill, one could easily find it reasonably necessary to
the normal operations of, for example, a Southern department store
to hire only white sales personnel.'78 But Congress did find it neces-
sary to include national origin in the section 703 (e) (1) exemptions
for occupational qualifications. It would seem, however, that this
exception will have relatively little impact on hiring practices.'
175. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). This approach would have little
effect on present state laws which have enjoyed relatively unhampered development in
classifying and discriminating on the basis of sex under the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
176. 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1964).
177. This exception is found in most state PEP laws. E.g., OHno REV. CODE §
4112.02 (E).
178. See Equal Employment Opportunity Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Em-
ployment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1963).
179. The discussion on the House floor at the time this provision was inserted sheds
some light on its purpose. Congressman Dent pointed out that a French or Italian
restaurant, for example, would be permitted to advertise or otherwise discriminate
against other job applicants for a chef whose country of origin was France or Italy.
Likewise, it was stated that a store selling religious articles of a particular faith would
be permitted to advertise for and hire someone of that religion. 110 CONG. REC. 2457
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However, the bona fide occupational qualification exemption will,
as previously discussed,18 assume great significance as perhaps the
only defense against an uncritical and unintended application of the
act's proscription of discrimination on account of sex.18'
Another exception of broad application is found in section
703 (g).182 Here it is provided in effect that it is not unlawful for
an employer under a government security program to deny an indi-
vidual a job due to that individual's inability to obtain security clear-
ance. While it would appear that such a refusal by an employer
could hardly be deemed discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, it was felt that it might have some
application, for example, in cases where a job applicant was denied
employment because of relatives living in a Communist country. 3
Closely related to this section is a third broad exception that excludes
from unlawful employment practices any employment discrimination
against an individual who "is a member of the Communist Party of
the United States or of any other organization required to register as
a Communist-action or Communist-front organization .... 1,184 It is
doubtful whether this provision has any substantive effect since the act
does not prohibit discrimination on political grounds. It appears to
have been inserted merely as another testimonial of congressional
opposition to Communism.'85
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964). But, as one writer has pointed out, even these examples are
questionable. "It would be proper to require that a chef in a French restaurant be able
to prepare French cuisine, but it does not seem reasonably necessary to the operation
of the restaurant that he be of French origin." Berg, supra note 146, at 72 n. 18.
180. See text at pp. 643-44 supra.
181. Section 703(e) (2), 78 Star. 256, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (2) (1964), con-
tains a'nother broad principle of nondiscrimination relative to the hiring policies of
religiously affijiated educational institutions. This section overlaps considerably the
provisions of § 702 which exempt all educational institutions, both religious and
secular, from the title with respect to their educational employees. The major differ-
ence, therefore, between the two sections is that § 703 (e) (2) is limited to religiously
affiliated educational institutions, but extends to all skilled and unskilled employees of
those institutions, whereas § 702 is not limited to just religiously affiliated institutions,
but is limited to educational employees of the institutions.
182. 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(g) (1964).
183. In discussing this exemption during a Senate debate, Senator Humphrey stated:
"(Ihis provision is intended to cover the obvious situation where a person, for one
reason or another, is simply not able to obtain a required security clearance. In such
cases, the employer should not be liable under this title if he refuses to hire or discharges
such a person for that reason." 110 CONG. REC. 12297 (daily ed. June 8, 1964).
184. . Section 703(f), 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(f) (1964). Whether an
individual is so affiliated with the Communist Party is determined "by final order of
the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950." Ibid.
185. See 110 CONG. REc. 2626 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1964).
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The fourth exception of broad application relates to different
standards, compensation, terms, or conditions of employment which
are applied pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system."8 6 This
provision does not appear to effect a substantive change in the title
in that it does no more than provide that differences in treatment
based on certain factors other than race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin are not prohibited where not employed intentionally
to accomplish discrimination indirectly. Senator Humphrey indi-
cated the scope of this provision in his statement on the floor of the
Senate: "For example, if an employer has two plants in different lo-
cations, and one of the plants employs substantially more Negroes
than the other, it is not unlawful discrimination if the pay, condi-
tions, or facilities are better at one plant than at the other unless it is
shown that the employer was intending to discriminate for or against
one of the racial groups." '187
The second part of section 703 (h) provides that it shall not be
unlawful for an employer "to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended
or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or nation-
al origin."'l s This provision, like the first part of section 703 (h),
is merely a clarifying amendment. It was proposed on the floor
of the Senate and was apparently inserted'89 to avoid the results
186. Section 703(h), 78 Star. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
187. 110 CONG. REC. 12297 (daily ed. June 4. 1964). Senator Hill, however, con-
tended that Title VII would undermine vested seniority rights, deny unions their repre-
sentation rights, and require racial quotas. At the request of Senator Clark, the
Justice Department prepared a rebuttal to these arguments which was ordered to be
printed in the Congressional Record as follows:
First, it has been asserted that tide VII would undermine vested rights of
seniority. This is not correct. Title VII would have no effect on seniority
rights existing at the time it takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargain-
ing contract provides that in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last
must be laid off first, such a provision would not be affected in the least by
title VII. This would be true even in the case where owing to discrimination
prior to the effective date of the title, white workers had more seniority than
Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. It is perfectly clear that when a worker is laid off or
denied a chance for promotion because under established seniority rules he is
"low man on the totem pole" he is not being discriminated against because of
his race. Of course, if the seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be
unlawful under title VII. If a rule were to state that all Negroes must be laid
off before any white man, such a rule could not serve as the basis for a dis-
charge subsequent to the effective date of the title. 110 CONG. REc. 6986
(daily ed. April 8, 1964).
188. 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
189. See 110 CONG. REC. 13246 (daily ed. June 13, 1964).
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reached in Myart v. Motorola, Inc."0' In that case, a hearing exam-
iner for the Illinois FEPC held that a Negro applicant for a job as
analyzer and phaser at Motorola had not been accorded equal oppor-
tunity for employment because the written test he took did not "re-
flect and equate inequalities and environmental factors among the
disadvantaged and culturally deprived groups."'' Although the
proponents of the Civil Rights .Act denied that such a result could
be reached under Tide VII,1' 2 the skeptics wanted this additional as-
surance that employers would still be free to hire only qualified job
applicants.
The final part of section 703 (h) dealing with pay differentials
based on sex does appear to effect a substantive change in the title.
In essence, it provides that an employer may differentiate upon
the basis of sex in determining wages "if such discrimination is au-
thorized by the provisions of section 6(d) t193] of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.... ." ' This provision was inserted by the
so-called Bennett amendment to prevent any conflict between the
provisions of Title VII and section 6 (d) of the FLSA."' However,
it is not clear what conflicts were contemplated. Section 6(d) of
the FLSA does not affirmatively authorize such a differentiation in
compensation on the basis of sex; it merely permits a differentiation
in compensation based on seniority and merit systems which may
be completely unrelated to the sex factor. There is, however, one fore-
seeable conflict in the coverage provisions of the two acts. Many of
the employers covered by Title VII would appear to be exempt un-
der the pay provision of the FLSA."9 ' This is perhaps what was con-
190. Charge No. 63-127 (Ill. Fair Employment Practices Commn 1964) (mimeo ed.).
The instant case was subsequently modified by the full commission which found that
it was unnecessary to pass on the validity of the test. Myart v. Motorola, Inc., 4 P-H
LD. REL. REP. 5 97,154 (1964).
191. Myart v. Motorola, Inc., Charge No. 63-127, p. 9 (III. Fair Employment Prac-
tices Comm'n 1964) (mimeo ed). In addition, the hearing examiner emphasized that
revision of application tests and forms might not adequately deal with this problem.
"Selection techniques may have to be modified at the outset in the light of the experience,
education or attitudes of the group.... The employer may have to establish in-plant
training programs and employ the heretofore culturally deprived ... as learners, placing
them under such supervision that will enabe them to achieve job success." Id. at 10.
192. The title "expressly protects the employer's right to insist that any prospective
applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifications." 110 CONG.
REC. 7026 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
193. 77 Star. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C. S 206(d) -(1964).
194. 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2(h) (1964). The wage differentiation
provision was added to the FLSA by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 56 (1963),
29 U.S.C. S 206(d) (1964), whichprohibits discrimination in wages on account of sex.
195. See 110 CoNG. REc. 13168 (daily ed. June 12, 1964).
196. One writer has explained this potential conflict as follows: 'The Equal Pay
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templated by the drafters of the Bennet amendment, i.e., discrimina-
tion in compensation on the basis of sex is not violative of the
broader coverage of Title VII unless it also violates the narrower
provisions of section 6(d) of the FLSA."9'
IV. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
TITLE VII
A. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
The administration and enforcement provisions of Title VII un-
derwent two complete metamorphoses before final agreement in the
House and Senate. " 8 As presently constituted, the principal enforce-
Act was an amendment to section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and its coverage is
dependent on that of section 6. The provisions of section 6 are applicable to employees
'engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce' and to employees
of certain enterprises which are 'engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce.' These are narrower concepts than 'an industry affecting commerce,'
the standard for Title VII ...." Berg, supra note 146, at 75-6. This writer goes on to
add that § 13 of the FLSA, 74 Star. 417, 29 U.S.C. 5 213 (1960), "contains numerous
specific exceptions from the coverage of section 6, some involving significant numbers
of employees. Consequently, there are numerous employers covered by Title VII who
are wholly or partially exempt from coverage of the Equal Pay Act." Id. at 76.
197. Two other exceptions of narrower application are worthy of mention. First, as
previously indicated, Indians have been given preferential treatment in employment by
businesses on or near an Indian reservation. See note 144 supra and accompanying
text. Another exception involves the problem of racial imbalance in employment.
To allay the fears of the opponents of Tide VII that the title would require hiring
members of minority groups on the basis of quotas in order to rectify existing im-
balances in employment, § 703(j), 78 Star. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j) (1964),
was inserted in the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise. In essence, it states that Tide VII
does not require that preferential treatment be given any individual or group on ac-
count of an imbalance that may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed in a particular
business as compared with the total number or percentage of such persons in that or
any other area. See 110 CONG. REC. 6992 (daily ed. April 8, 1964) (remarks of
Senators Clark and Case). However, it is important to note that this provision does
not add or detract from the probative force which evidence of imbalance may have
in a given case. And it is in this respect that Title VII, although not demanding remedy
of racial imbalance, places some psychological pressure on an employer to increase the
percentage of minority group members on the payroll. This is particularly true if the
reports that must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission compel
the employer to specify the number or percentage of minority group members in various
job classifications. Thus, to prevent litigation and avoid not only discrimination but
any semblance of it, the average employer will no doubt be inclined to be conscious of
racial balance in the business.
198. The administration bill as introduced by Congressman CeIler and approved by
the House Judiciary Subcommittee provided for an administrative agency to administer
and enforce the tide that would have worked very much like the NLRB. It provided
for the usual complaint, notice of hearing and hearing, and cease and desist order. How-
ever, the House Judiciary Committee changed this by providing for enforcement by
means of a de novo court proceeding initiated by the EEOC, and the House approved
these changes. In the Senate, this approach was abandoned and a fundamentally new line
was taken. In the Dirksen-Mansfield version, the philosophy of government-initiated
enforcement was for the most part abandoned, and substituted in its place was the
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ment responsibility under Title VII has been assigned to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) created by section
705.' This new Commission is a permanent body composed of
five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate. 2
00
The principal responsibilities left to the Commission are: (1) in-
vestigation and conciliation of complaints;01  (2) promulgation of
technical studies as are appropriate to effect the purposes and policies
of the act;202 (3) cooperation with state and local agencies, both
public and private, to further voluntary compliance with the tide;.. 3
(4) reference of matters to the Attorney General with recommenda-
tions for intervention in a civil action brought by an aggrieved party
or for the institution of a civil action by the Attorney General in
appropriate cases; 04 and (5) interpretation of the provisions of
Tide VI."5 The chairman of the Commission will be responsible
for the administrative operations of the Commission, but in most
instances the activities of the Commission will be carried out by one
or more commissioners with the aid of the Commission staff.
(1) Complaint Procedures.-Two methods are prescribed by
section 706 for instituting a proceeding before the Commission: a
charge may be made in writing under oath by a person claiming to
be aggrieved, or a member of the Commission may file a written
charge if there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has oc-
curred. 0' However, the Commission is not authorized to conduct
concept of private enforcement. This ultimately became the philosophy of the entire
act. See BUREAU oF NATIONAL AEFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 41
(1964)."
199. 78 Star. 258, 42 U.S.C.A. 52000e-4(a) (1964).
200. Not more than three of the commissioners may be members of the same political
party. They are appointed for staggered five-year terms; one of the original members
will be appointed for a term of one year, one for two years and so on. The successors.
of the original members will, however, serve full five-year terms. Section 705 (a), 78
Star. 258, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(a) (1964).
201. Section 705(g) (4), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-4(f) (4) (1964).
202. Section 705(g) (5), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-4(f) (5) (1964).
203. Section 705(g) (1), 78 Star. 258, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(f) (1) (1964).
204. Section 705(g) (6), 78 Star. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(f) (6) (1964).
205. Section 713 (b), 78 Star. 265, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-12 (b) (1964). This section
specifically provides for good faith reliance on a formal commission interpretation as a
defense to a charge of unlawful employment practices. Thus, although the Commission
has no legislative or quasi-legislative power with respect to substantive rights and obli-
gations under the title, its role as interpreter will no doubt be of great significance to
courts and litigants.
206. Section 706(a), 78"Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (a) (1964). Subsection
(d) of section 706 further provides that such a charge "shall be filed within ninety
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, except that in the case
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an investigation in the absence of a formal charge. This is a serious
omission." 7 Most state commissions are similarly handicapped,. 8
and it was hoped by critics of present state procedures that such a
fate would not befall the federal act.2 °9
Upon receipt of a complaint, the Commission initiates an investi-
gation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the
allegations are true."' If such cause is found, "the Commission shall
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persua-
sion." '' However, nothing said or done during this stage of the
charge may be made public by the Commission without the written
consent of the parties." 2 In fact, the Senate was so insistent about
avoiding publicity as a method of enforcement that it added a pro-
vision making it a misdemeanor, with a penalty of $1,000 fine or
imprisonment for not more than one year upon conviction of any offi-
of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has fol-
lowed the procedure set out in subsection (b) [prior resort to state proceedings], such
charge shall be filed by the person aggrieved within two hundred and ten days after the
alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving
notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or
local law, whichever is earlier ...." 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (d) (1964).
There has been some dispute as to (1) whether the aggrieved individual may bypass
the Commission and go directly to court, and (2) if not, whether it is a prerequisite to
bringing suit in court that the Commission have found that there is reasonable cause
to believe the employer guilty of the charge which it has failed to adjust by conciliation.
With respect to the first question, Senator Humphrey stated during the Senate debate
on this matter that it was his opinion that "the individual may take his complaint to the
Commission, he may bypass the Commission, or he may go directly to court." 110
CONG. REC. 13694 (daily ed. June 17, 1964). (Emphasis added.) On the second
point, Senator Erwin had the following comment: "[The bill certainly puts the key
to the courthouse door in the hands of the Commission. This is true because the ag-
grieved party cannot sue in the federal courts unless the Commission first finds that
there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true and then fails to adjust the matter
by conciliation. So the Commission holds the key to the courthouse door, which cannot
be unlocked for the aggrieved party's benefit unless the Commission finds that there is
reasohable cause to believe the employer guilty of the charge of discrimination and
fails to adjust the complaint by conciliation." 110 CONG. REC. 13695 (daily ed. June
17, 1964). However, Senator Javits was of the opinion that the complainant may
bring.suit whether or not the Commission makes a determination of reasonable cause
under § 706(a). 110 CONG. REc. 13697 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
207. It has been shown that civil rights commissions can achieve more positive results
through broad investigations of employment patterns than through procedures geared
to the unrelated and relatively insignificant nature of individual complaints. See Girard
& Jaffe, Some General Observations on Administration of State Fair Employment Prac-
tice Laws, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 115 (1964).
208. See notes 51 & 52 supra and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions, 14
BUFFALO L. REV. 22 (1964).




cer or employee of the Commission for making public any informa-
tion about the charge.213 However, in states or localities where there
is a local FEP law, none of these steps may be taken until the state
or local agency has had sixty days to deal with the case.214 But once
the sixty days have elapsed, the complainant may take the case to
the Commission regardless of its status in the state proceeding.2 "
In addition, Senator Humphrey explained that "to avoid the pos-
sible imposition of onerous State requirements for initiating a pro-
ceeding, subsection (b) provides that to comply with the require-
ment of prior resort to the State agency, an individual need merely
send a written statement of the facts to the State agency by regis-
tered mail." '216 If the charge has been initiated by a member of the
213. Ibid. In explanation of this provision, Senator Humphrey stated that "this is a
ban on publicizing and not on such disclosure as is necessary to carrying out of the
Commission's duties under the statute." 110 CONG. REC. 12297 (daily ed. June 4,
1964). It therefore does not prohibit the Commission from disclosing such information
to state agencies or other federal agencies for purposes of investigation or settlement of
the charge; "rather, [it] is aimed at the making available to the general public of un-
proven charges." Ibid.
214. Section 706(b), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-5(b) (1964). This section
applies to states with full FEPC laws (note 27 supra) and to states that
make employment discrimination a misdemeanor (note 28 supra). See S 706(b)
which provides that prior resort is required only where the state or local law prohibits
the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishes or authorizes the state or
local authorities to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceed-
ings with respect thereto. It does not apply, therefore, to state statutes that make com-
pliance strictly voluntary and have no enforcement provisions. See note 29 supra.
From this it would also follow that if the state law does prohibit certain forms of dis-
crimination in employment, but does not cover the discrimination in question, as for
example on account of sex, there is no requirement of prior resort to state proceedings.
If the state or local law has been in effect for less than one year, this period is extended
to 120 days.
This provision for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction has led one writer to
question whether a complainant's charge with the federal Commission might not be
properly barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel because of a prior determination ifi
state proceedings that discrimination had not occurred. See Berg, Equal Eftployment
Opportunity Under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYkN L. REV. 62, 83-84
(1964). First, there is the question of how far res judicata is applicable to administra-
tive determinations. See Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906); DAVIS, ADINMlr-
ISTRATIVE LAW § 18.02 (1959). But assuming that this is no problem, the relevant
factors would be whether the state determination was made by a court or a quasi-judicial
board, such as hearing examiners or a panel of commissioners, and whether the com-
plainant'was sufficiently involved in the matter. With respect to the latter factor, it
could be argued on the basis of Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 17 Conn..Supp. 93. (Super.
Ct. 1950), that since the complainant has no right or interest in the proceeding and the
state commission is the adversary of the employer, the complainant should not be
bound by the state proceeding in a subsequent action before the federal Commission.
In addition, since § 706(b) requires resort to state procedures before a complainani
can invoke Title VII, there is a good argument that a complainant did not elect the
state remedy and therefore should not be bound by it.
215. Section 706(b), 78 Star. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-5(b) (1964).
216. 110 CONG. REC. 12297 (daily ed. June 4, 1964).
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Commission, a similar prior resort to state procedures is required.217
Before the Commission may take any action it must notify the ap-
propriate state or local officials, and upon request must yield to
them for a reasonable time to act under the state or local law. 18
(2) Record Requirements and Investigatory Powers.-The
EEOC was originally given broad investigatory powers to police dis-
crimination in employment. 219 However, as in many other places
in the House version of the act, these powers were severely limited
in the Senate by the leadership compromise.220
The principal provisions relating to investigations and record-
keeping are contained in sections 709221 and 7 10.222 Section 709 (c),
which contains the broadest provisions, relates to record-keeping. It
gives the Commission the power to require employers and labor or-
ganizations which control apprenticeship or training programs to
maintain records on such matters as the names of applicants who
wish to participate in such a program, the chronological order in
which applications were received, and a detailed description of the
manner in which persons are selected to participate in an apprentice
or training program.223 Section 709 (d), 24 however, destroys much
of this power by creating two categories of exemptions. The first
category exempts any employer, employment agency, or labor or-
ganization that is subject to a state or local FEP law from the record-
keeping requirements of subsection (c).225 The legislative history of
this provision indicates the reason for this exemption as intending to
avoid a duplication of record-keeping.22 6 However, this reasoning is
factually unjustified since few if any states require records of this na-
ture. But this exemption is in turn qualified by a provision that
217. Section 706(c), 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(c) (1964).
218. Ibid. For a discussion of this section by Senator Humphrey see 110 CONG. REc.
13694 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
219. In the House version, it was intended that the Commission police discrimination
with the same investigatory power that the Federal Trade Commission exercises in the
area of business regulation. 38 Star. 722-23 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1958).
However, the Senate leadership compromise rewrote this provision so that now the
powers of the Commission are more akin to those of the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service. See 110 CONG. REC. 13695 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
220. See 110 CONG. REc. 12384 (daily ed. June 5, 1964) (Senator Dirksen's ex-
planation of changes made by Senate bill).
221. 78 Star. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-8 (1964).
222. 78 Stat. 264,42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-9 (1964).
223. 78 Stat. 263, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(c) (1964).
224. 78 Stat. 263, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(d) (1964).
225. Section 709(c), 78 Stat. 263, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(c) (1964).
226. 110 CONG. REc. 12296 (daily ed. June 8, 1964).
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authorizes the federal Commission to require "notations on records
which such employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee keeps or is required to keep as
are necessary because of differences in coverage or methods of en-
forcement between the State or local law and the provisions of this
title."227  The second category offers complete exemption from the
record-keeping requirements of subsection (c) to government con-
tractors subject to the reporting requirements of Executive Order
10925.228 The third method of avoiding the Commission's record-
keeping requirements is by way of a hardship provision in subsection
(c) itself. Here it is provided not only that such record-keeping re-
quirements may not be adopted without a public hearing, but in ad-
dition that exemptions may be obtained from some or all of the re-
quirements from the Commission or the courts upon a showing that
such requirements would impose an undue hardship.
The investigatory powers of the Commission are contained in
sections 709 (a)29 and 710.2' The House version of these sections
would have conferred broad subpoena and investigatory powers on
the Commission,231 but the Senate, consistent with its pattern of
de-emphasizing the Commission's role in other areas, abandoned
this approach for much more limited powers. As finally amended,
the Commission is only given authority under section 710(a) "to
examine witnesses under oath and to require the production of docu-
mentary evidence relevant or material to the charge under investiga-
tion. '  Unlike other federal agencies,.33 the Commission has no
227. Section 709(d), 78 Stat. 263, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-8(d) (1964).
228. Ibid.
229. 78 Star. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-8(a) (1964). This section is patterned on
§ 11 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 49 Star. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 5 161(1)
(1958). It permits the Commission's access to, for purposes of examination and the
right to copy, any evidence "of any person being investigated or proceeded against that
relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this title and is relevant to the
charge under investigation."
230. 78 Stat. 264, 42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-9 (1964).
231. The House bill based what is now § 710(a) of the tide on 55 9 and 10 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 38 Stat. 722-23 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 55 49, 50 (1958).
These sections confer broad subpoena and investigatory powers on the FTC,.and grant
immunity from antitrust prosecution to persons who testify before the Commission.
However, the House version of 5 710 (a) would have limited the immunity provisions
for testimony before the EEOC to something akin to the provisions in 5 307(g) of
the Federal Power Commission Act, 49 Stat. 858 (1935), 16 U.S.C. 5 825F(g)
(1958), which grants immunity only to witnesses who assert their privilege against self-
incrimination.
232. 78 Stat. 264,42 U.S.C.A. 5 2000e-9(a) (1964).
233. E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 55 9, 10, 38 Stat. 722-23 (1914), 15
U.S.C. 55 49, 50 (1958).
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power to issue subpoenas; it may only issue a "demand" which, when
not complied with, must be submitted to a court with a request for
an order requiring compliance." 4 Section 710 also prevents the
Commission from requiring the attendance of a witness from out-
side of the state where he is found, resides, or transacts business, or
the production of evidence outside the state where it is kept." Any-
one served with a demand to appear as a witness or produce evidence
has twenty days in which to file objections to such demand;236 ob-
jections not raised within this time period cannot be urged as de-
fenses to a proceeding initiated by the Commission to enforce its
demand, barring special circumstances." 7
(3) Agreements with State Agencies.-As indicated previous-
ly,238 many critics of state FEP laws have cited insufficient funds and
inadequate staffs as being the major reasons for the failure of state
commissions to make significant progress in eliminating discrimina-
tion in employment.2 31 Section 709 (b) purports to offer some so-
lution to this problem by authorizing the EEOC to cooperate with
state and local agencies and their employees, with reimbursement
to them for services rendered to assist the Commission in carrying
out the provisions of Title VII.24° This of course opens up possibili-
ties of pooling EEOC funds and enforcement powers with state
and local agency resources. In addition, section 706(b) authorizes
the Commission to enter into agreements with state and local agen-
cies whereby the Commission would give up its concurrent jurisdic-
tion over certain classes of cases.24' Such agreements would affect
234. Section 710(b), 78 Stat. 264, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-9(b) (1964).
235. Ibid.
236. Section 710(c), 78 Stat. 264, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-9(c) (1964).
237. The special circumstances are: (1) if the proceeding is commenced by the Com-
mission prior to the expiration of the twenty-day period; or (2) if the court determines
that the person subject to the demand could not have reasonably been aware of the
availability of such ground of objection. Section 710(c), 78 Star. 264, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-9(c) (1964).
238. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Feild, Hindsight and Foresight About FEPC, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 16,
18 (1964).
240. 78 Star. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(b) (1964).
241. The legislative history of the act provides no answer to the question of whether
once the Commission gives up jurisdiction over a class of cases, the state would still be
entitled to reimbursement from the Commission for handling them. In this respect,
one writer has pointed out that in the House version of the act, the cession authority
and the reimbursement authority were in different sections and thus it could have been
argued that they applied to mutually exclusive situations. However, since the two pro-
visions were merged into one section in the final version by the Senate, a good argu-
ment could be made to the contrary. See Berg, supra note 214, at 91-92.
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not only the Commission's power to enter into matters arising in
states or localities with FEP laws, but also an individual's right to
bring a charge under the federal act.
B. Enforcement Procedures
(1) Private Enforcement.-As originally conceived, the em-
ployment title of the Civil Rights Act gave the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission authority to bring suits in federal court to
effect compliance with its provisions."' It was intended that the
Commission be enabled to assert the public interest in the preven-
tion of discrimination in employment and obtain broad compliance
with the provisions of the act through quasi-judicial powers and au-
thority to issue cease and desist orders enforceable by the courts.
However, this approach was drastically changed in the Senate; the
emphasis was shifted from obtaining broad compliance to the resolu-
tion of individual grievances.243 Thus, under the present form of
the act, failure of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance
through conciliation and persuasion is of little consequence to the
respondent; 44  the Commission merely notifies the person ag-
grieved245 and only that person or, if such charge was filed by a
member of the Commission, and person whom the charge alleges
242. See 110 CONG. REc. 13694 (daily ed. June 17, 1964) (remarks of Senator Sal-
tonstall).
243. In the Senate debate on this matter, the following colloquy between Senators
Douglas and Pastore is an indication of the diverse opinion on the propriety of the
change. Senator Douglas asked: "Is it not true that as a result of the compromise, so
far as the ability to initiate legal action is concerned, the Commission is a blind alley
and a delaying chamber, and that its only power is that of putting a searchlight on the
facts and attempting conciliation?" 110 CONG. REc. 13695 (daily ed. June 17, 1964).
Senator Pastore replied: "If we... do anything... about this problem in the public
interest, we must give the authority to a member of the Commission to initiate a charge
where he feels that there is a pattern of discrimination. The Commission can then in-
vestigate it. It can adjust the dispute by voluntary means, if possible; or, if not, it may
make a recommendation. But we must always bear in mind that the Commission, or a
member of the Commission, is not the prosecutor, and not the judge. All that the Com-
mission can do is to investigate and recommend. But it cannot implement its recom-
mendation. Ibid.
244. Berg, supra note 214, at 85 submits that this shift will have serious consequences
as regards the Commission's efforts to obtain voluntary compliance. "With authority
to bring its own suit, the Commission would have been in a position to seek through
its conciliation efforts complete elimination of the discriminatory practice charged, as
well as any other which was turned up during the investigation. Under section 706
in its present form the Commission is largely deprived of its control over the concilia-
tion proceeding. Since suit will be brought by the complainant, if at all, the goal of
conciliation must be a settlement satisfactory to him, and the public interest in the
elimination of the discriminatory practice is unprotected." Id. at 85-86.
245. Section 706(e), 78 Star. 260, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
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was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful practice,24 may seek equitable
relief in federal court.247
Once the aggrieved individual brings suit, however, there is still
some question as to what remedy is available. In this connection,
section 706(g)24 raises certain ambiguities; it merely provides that
if the court finds against the respondent, it may "enjoin the respon-
dent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in-
clude reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay... -"249 The first question raised is whether this language was
intended to provide for vindication of just the aggrieved individual's
rights, or, on the other hand, was meant to encompass both the com-
plainant's rights and the rights of all others similarly situated.2 0  It
would seem that if section 706 is to function properly, it must be
held to vindicate both public and private rights; that if unlawful dis-
crimination is established in the individual's suit, the court's decree
ought to be broad enough to remedy not only the single individual's
grievances, but also the interests of the public in the cessation of un-
lawful discrimination against all members of the same class.25'
(2) Suits by the Attorney General.-Under section 707, the
Attorney General is empowered to bring a civil action for preventive
246. ibid.
247. Section 706(e) makes provision for discretionary power in the courts to appoint
an attorney for the complainant, and authorizes the commencement of the action with-
out the payment of court fees. Section 706(k), 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (k)(1964), allows the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
248. 78 Star. 261, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (g) (1964).
249. Ibid.
250. Distinction must be made here between a class action and an action by an in-
dividual from which inherently flows both private relief and relief for other members of
the same class. With respect to the latter, it has been suggested that vindication of an
individual's rights necessarily includes vindication of the rights of class members, for
the interests of the individual lie not only in acquiring individual freedom from dis-
crimination, but also in acquiring access to nondiscriminating facilities. See Bailey v.
Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964).
Class actions have, however, been used quite frequently in other race relations cases. See,
e.g., Gantt v. Clemson Agricultural College, 320 F.2d 611 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 814 (1963). But their use in employment discrimination presents problems
in that (1) the membership of the class represented is often difficult to define, and (2)
there is usually no apparent policy to discriminate which would give rise to a common
question of law or fact.
251. Consideration should also be given here to section 706(i), 78 Stat. 261, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (i) (1964), which provides that "in any case in which an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued
in civil action brought under section (e), the Commission may commence proceedings
to compel compliance with such order." This would indicate that Congress envisioned
orders requiring broad supervisory functions by the Commission and thus relief not
limited solely to the individual complainant.
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relief whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that any person is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the provisions of
the act.252 In any such proceeding, the Attorney General may re-
quest that a three-judge court be convened to hear the case; but only
the Attorney General may demand such a court, not the respond-
ent.253 To expedite matters, section 707 (b) provides that such ac-
tions are entitled to priority on a district court's docket, 54 and since
the cases are heard by a three-judge court, appeals lie not to the
circuit courts of appeals, but directly to the United States Supreme
Court.
One of the major problems under section 707 will be to deter-
mine what constitutes a pattern or practice of discrimination. On
this point, Senator Humphrey stated that "such a pattern or prac-
tice would be present only when the denial of rights consists of some-
thing more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, rou-
tine, or of a generalized nature." ' 5  He went on to explain that
"there would be a pattern or practice, if, for example, a number of
companies or persons in the same industry or line of business dis-
criminated, if a chain of motels or restaurants practiced racial dis-
crimination throughout all or a significant part of its system, or if a
company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the
statute."2"6 In the latter respect, there arises a further question as to
when this pattern or practice of discrimination must have existed.
A literal reading of section 707 (a) would indicate that pre-statute
activity would be irrelevant, for it provides that the Attorney Gen-
252. 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). The Attorney General may
also intervene in a private civil action brought under § 706 where he is able to certify
that the case is of great public importance. Section 706(e), 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1964).
253. Section 707(b), 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(b) (1964).
254. "Upon receipt of such request it shall be the duty of the chief judge of the
circuit or the presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate immediately
three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one shall be a circuit judge and another
of whom shall be a district judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted,
to hear and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so designated to
assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing
and determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited." Section
707(b), 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(b) (1964).
255. 110 CONG. REC. 13776 (daily ed. June 18, 1964).
256. Ibid. Senator Humphrey also pointed out that "as a further safeguard, the bill
requires a showing that those engaged in the pattern or practice had the intention to
deprive others of their rights under... title VII .... The issue would then be whether,
as a matter of fact, there was a refusal of ... employment amounting to a pattern or
practice, not whether the companies acted in concert or in a conspiracy. And the bill
would authorize the Attorney General to join all or some of several defendants in the
same action." Ibid.
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eral's action must be directed to "resistance to the full enjoyment
of any of the rights secured by this title."'257 However, there is some
indirect authority to the contrary. 58
V. CONCLUSION
The pattern of Title VII is a unique combination of solicitation
of cooperative state legislation and provision for federal machinery
to remedy discrimination in employment; it provides a method of
vindicating federal rights while at the same time adds incentive to
state and local commissions to deal with local problems through
local action.259 In this respect, Title VII will perhaps have its great-
est impact on Southern states which, for the most part, have not en-
acted FEP laws.26" These states will be faced with the choice of
either passing their own laws, no matter how unpopular, to end dis-
crimination in employment, or suffering an increased amount of
federal intervention.
The impact of Title VII in the North will be felt less in terms
of new legislation since most of these states have FEP laws, but cer-
tainly more in terms of federal policing of administrative procedures.
The threat of federal intervention after sixty days26' will have a sub-
stantial effect on curbing what critics of present state procedures
characterize as dilatory tactics.262 This in turn will have the unfortu-
nate effect of causing state commissions to put more emphasis on the
resolution of individual complaints rather than a company-wide at-
tack on broad patterns of discrimination. But this disadvantage may
be offset by the additional effect the threat of federal intervention
257. 78 Stat. 261, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6(a) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
258. See Electrical Workers v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 140 Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366
(1953), wherein it was stated: "Exception was taken to the admission before the
hearing tribunal of the testimony of Silas Hill as to the plaintiff's having discriminated
against him in 1946, particularly because it related to incidents before the enactment
of the Fair Employment Practices Act. Administrative agencies are not bound by the
strict rules of evidence. . . . 'Upon questions of knowledge, good faith or intent, any
other transactions from which any inference respecting the quo animo may be drawn
are admissible.... It has sometimes been thought that the other transactions should be
cotemporaneous, or nearly so, but that is not essential .I . . 2" ld. at 546, 102 A.2d at
371. (Citations omitted.)
259. E.g., S 709(b), 78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-8(b) (1964), which pro-
vides that the Commission may enter into agreements with state and local agencies
whereby the federal Commission would give up its concurrent jurisdiction over certain
classes of cases.
260. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
261. Section 706(b), 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (1964).
262. See, e.g., BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE 135 (1952); Rabkin, Enforcement of
Laws Against Discrimination in Employment, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 100 (1964). For
a further discussion of the delay in state procedures see note 53 supra.
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may have upon the respondent. Knowing that the complainant is
free to file a charge with the federal Commission after sixty days
may prod many employers, employment agencies, or labor organiza-
tions to agree to broad conciliation agreements under state proce-
dures rather than risk the possibility of federal prosecution.
The implementation of Title VII will also have the effect of
causing an increase in the number of complaints filed with state
commissions." 3 New militancy, greater awareness of the law, " '
lessened fear of retaliation,2 ' and the support of federal investigatory
and enforcement facilities will all have a tendency to promote
greater complaint-filing activity under state procedures. Whether
state commissions thus become the main forum to which civil rights.
groups and aggrieved individuals look for redress will depend on the
response they give to this increased activity in terms of increased
budgets and staffs. 6" If the state commissions respond to the chal-
lenge, there will be little need to resort to federal machinery. On
the other hand, if the state commissions continue to pursue their
present line of least resistance," 7 they will soon become mere way-
stations where complaints wait out their time before being filed with
the federal Commission.
GARY L. BRYENTON
263. This has traditionally been one of the major criticisms of state FEP laws. See
note 42 supra and accompanying text.
264. For a discussion of this problem before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
see note 48 supra and accompanying text.
265. The federal act explicitly prohibits discrimination based on such retaliation.
Section 704(a), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a) (1964), provides that "it
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate
against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member
thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this title."
266. For a discussion of the present condition of state commissions in this regard see
note 16 supra and accompanying text.
267. Critics of present state procedure maintain that state commissions are reluctant
to utilize the threat of punitive measures; that they are reluctant to enter into public
hearings or to issue cease and desist orders because they fear that such action will in-
crease employer and labor union resistance to conciliatory efforts. See BERGER, op. cit.
supra note 262, at 117; Hill, supra note 209, at 36. Rrom this the conclusion in drawn
that many commissions settle for less than full compliance with the law. See note 70
supra and accompanying text.
